We study outsourcing relationships among international asset management firms. We find that, in companies that manage both outsourced and in-house funds, in-house funds outperform outsourced funds by 0.85% annually (57% of the expense ratio). We attribute this result to preferential treatment of in-house funds via the preferential allocation of IPOs, trading opportunities, and cross-trades, especially at times when in-house funds face steep outflows and require liquidity. We explain preferential treatment with agency problems: it increases with the subcontractor's market power and the difficulty of monitoring the subcontractor, and decreases with the subcontractor's amount of parallel in-house activity."> We study outsourcing relationships among international asset management firms. We find that, in companies that manage both outsourced and in-house funds, in-house funds outperform outsourced funds by 0.85% annually (57% of the expense ratio). We attribute this result to preferential treatment of in-house funds via the preferential allocation of IPOs, trading opportunities, and cross-trades, especially at times when in-house funds face steep outflows and require liquidity. We explain preferential treatment with agency problems: it increases with the subcontractor's market power and the difficulty of monitoring the subcontractor, and decreases with the subcontractor's amount of parallel in-house activity."> We study outsourcing relationships among international asset management firms. We find that, in companies that manage both outsourced and in-house funds, in-house funds outperf">
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Outsourcing in the International Mutual Fund Industry: An Equilibrium View

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  • OLEG CHUPRININ
  • MASSIMO MASSA
  • DAVID SCHUMACHER
Abstract
type="main"> We study outsourcing relationships among international asset management firms. We find that, in companies that manage both outsourced and in-house funds, in-house funds outperform outsourced funds by 0.85% annually (57% of the expense ratio). We attribute this result to preferential treatment of in-house funds via the preferential allocation of IPOs, trading opportunities, and cross-trades, especially at times when in-house funds face steep outflows and require liquidity. We explain preferential treatment with agency problems: it increases with the subcontractor's market power and the difficulty of monitoring the subcontractor, and decreases with the subcontractor's amount of parallel in-house activity.

Suggested Citation

  • Oleg Chuprinin & Massimo Massa & David Schumacher, 2015. "Outsourcing in the International Mutual Fund Industry: An Equilibrium View," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(5), pages 2275-2308, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:70:y:2015:i:5:p:2275-2308
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    Cited by:

    1. Kempf, Elisabeth & Luo, Mancy & Schäfer, Larissa & Tsoutsoura, Margarita, 2023. "Political ideology and international capital allocation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 150-173.
    2. Michel Verlaine, 2022. "Behavioral finance and the architecture of the asset management industry," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(5), pages 1454-1476, December.
    3. Kempf, Elisabeth & Luo, Mancy & Schafer, Larissa & Tsoutsoura, Margarita, 2022. "Does Political Partisanship Cross Borders? Evidence from International Capital Flows," Working Papers 316, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    4. Elif Sisli Ciamarra & Abigail Hornstein, 2015. "Board Overlaps in Mutual Fund Families," Working Papers 92, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School.
    5. Artiga Gonzalez, Tanja & Dyakov, Teodor & Inhoffen, Justus & Wipplinger, Evert, 2024. "Crowding of international mutual funds," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
    6. Beggs, William & DeVault, Luke, 2022. "Mutual fund (sub)advisor connections and crowds," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 231-252.
    7. Ferreira, Miguel A. & Matos, Pedro & Pereira, João Pedro & Pires, Pedro, 2017. "Do locals know better? A comparison of the performance of local and foreign institutional investors," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 151-164.
    8. Gökçen, Umut & Özsoy, S. Mehmet & Yalçın, Atakan, 2020. "Firm boundaries, incentives, and fund performance: Evidence from a private pension fund system," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(C).
    9. Alexander Eisele & Tamara Nefedova & Gianpaolo Parise, 2015. "Are Star Funds Really Shining? Cross-trading And Performance Shifting In Mutual Fund Families," Post-Print hal-01458357, HAL.
    10. Bryan D. MacGregor & Rainer Schulz & Yuan Zhao, 2021. "Performance and Market Maturity in Mutual Funds: Is Real Estate Different?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 437-492, October.
    11. Cici, Gjergji & Jaspersen, Stefan & Kempf, Alexander, 2015. "Speed of information diffusion within fund families," CFR Working Papers 15-02 [rev.], University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    12. Eisele, Alexander & Nefedova, Tamara & Parise, Gianpaolo & Peijnenburg, Kim, 2020. "Trading out of sight: An analysis of cross-trading in mutual fund families," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(2), pages 359-378.
    13. Brisker, Eric & Wang, Jinjing & Wang, Shuai, 2024. "Why do life insurers hold sin bonds? Evidence from investment delegation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    14. Anna (Ania) Zalewska, 2022. "Saving with Group or Individual Personal Pension Schemes: How Much Difference Does It Make?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5384-5402, July.
    15. Moreno, David & Rodríguez, Rosa & Zambrana, Rafael, 2018. "Management sub-advising in the mutual fund industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(3), pages 567-587.
    16. Gajewski, Jean-François & Tran Dieu, Linh, 2021. "Determinants and performance of outsourcing in the european mutual fund market," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    17. Wang, Z. Jay & Yang, Jingyun, 2021. "Cross-trading and liquidity management: Evidence from municipal bond funds," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    18. Khim, Veasna & Razafitombo, Hery, 2023. "Scale and skills in European active management: Impact of a new regulatory context," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    19. Jean-François Gajewski & Linh Tran Dieu, 2021. "Determinants And Performance Of Outsourcing In The European Mutual Fund Market," Post-Print hal-03221014, HAL.
    20. Luo, Mancy, 2017. "Essays in financial intermediation and political economy," Other publications TiSEM 146f40d3-6c89-4c6d-8fea-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    21. Casavecchia, Lorenzo & Ge, Chanyuan, 2019. "Jack of all trades versus specialists: Fund family specialization and mutual fund performance," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 69-85.
    22. Linda Allen & Suparna Chakraborty & Sonali Hazarika & Chih-Huei Su, 2020. "Bank dependence in emerging countries: Cross-border information percolation in mutual fund equity investing," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 51(2), pages 218-243, March.

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