Much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re-election, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a re-election hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for re-election. This generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election. We also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit."> Much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re-election, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a re-election hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for re-election. This generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election. We also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit."> Much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re-election, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. W">
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The Incumbency Effects of Signalling

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  • Francesco Caselli
  • Tom Cunningham
  • Massimo Morelli
  • Inés Moreno Barreda
Abstract
type="main" xml:id="ecca12060-abs-0001"> Much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re-election, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a re-election hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for re-election. This generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election. We also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Caselli & Tom Cunningham & Massimo Morelli & Inés Moreno Barreda, 2014. "The Incumbency Effects of Signalling," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 81(323), pages 397-418, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:81:y:2014:i:323:p:397-418
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    Cited by:

    1. Sascha Baghestanian & Sergey V. Popov, 2018. "On publication, refereeing and working hard," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1419-1459, November.
    2. Michael Albertus & Victor Gay, 2017. "Unlikely Democrats: Economic Elite Uncertainty under Dictatorship and Support for Democratization," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(3), pages 624-641, July.
    3. Leandro de Magalhaes & Salomo Hirvonen, 2019. "The Incumbent-Challenger Advantage and the Winner-Runner-up Advantage," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 19/710, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    4. Kemal Kıvanç Aköz & Cemal Eren Arbatli & Levent Celik, 2020. "Manipulation Through Biased Product Reviews," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(4), pages 591-639, December.
    5. Duggan, John, 2017. "Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 426-463.
    6. Frank Bohn, 2019. "Political budget cycles, incumbency advantage, and propaganda," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 43-70, March.

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