[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ajarec/v54y2010i3p301-320.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Transactions costs as an obstacle to fisheries self-governance in New Zealand

Author

Listed:
  • Ralph E. Townsend
Abstract
When faced with opportunities for greater self-governance, the New Zealand fishing industry managed to make only limited progress. Why industry was unable to progress self-management more effectively remains an interesting question. This paper argues that the benefits of greater self-governance were probably less than the significant transactions costs to self-organise. The benefits were probably smaller in New Zealand than elsewhere, because reform had already reduced the costs of fisheries administration. And the transactions costs confronting industry were substantial. First, unanimous agreement was required for self-governance, which created high transactions costs. Second, the tools for private enforcement were limited. Third, policy failed to specify clearly the expectations of self-governance, so the investments in self-governance are unusually risky. The government had unrealistic expectations that self-governance would solve third-party environmental externalities as well as fishing externalities. This implied high transactions costs to negotiate with third parties, such as environmental groups. Fourth, the standards for accountability were difficult to specify. This experience identifies four key policies if devolved fisheries governance is to be promoted: non-unanimous decision-making; private enforcement; clarity on areas for self-governance; and clarity on accountability standards. Copyright 2010 The Author. Journal compilation 2010 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Ralph E. Townsend, 2010. "Transactions costs as an obstacle to fisheries self-governance in New Zealand," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 54(3), pages 301-320, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajarec:v:54:y:2010:i:3:p:301-320
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-8489.2010.00494.x
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. Townsend, Ralph E. & McColl, James & Young, Michael D., 2006. "Design principles for individual transferable quotas," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 131-141, March.
    3. Harte, Michael, 2007. "Funding commercial fisheries management: Lessons from New Zealand," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 379-389, July.
    4. Bess, Randall & Harte, Michael, 2000. "The role of property rights in the development of New Zealand's seafood industry," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 331-339, July.
    5. Harte, Michael, 2001. "Opportunities and barriers for industry-led fisheries research," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 159-167, March.
    6. Robert H. Haveman, 1973. "Common Property, Congestion, and Environmental Pollution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(2), pages 278-287.
    7. Sen, Sevaly & Raakjaer Nielsen, Jesper, 1996. "Fisheries co-management: a comparative analysis," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 405-418, September.
    8. Anthony Scott, 1955. "The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(2), pages 116-116.
    9. Clark, Colin W. & Munro, Gordon R., 1978. "Renewable resource management and extinction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 198-205, June.
    10. Yang, Yu Wen & Frazer, Allen & Rees, Eugene, 2010. "Self-governance within a QMS framework--The evolution of self-governance in the New Zealand Bluff oyster fishery," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 261-267, March.
    11. Costello, Christopher J & Deacon, Robert T, 2007. "The Efficiency Gains from Fully Delineating Rights in an ITQ Fishery," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt56n8x9qb, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    12. Cheung, Steven N S, 1970. "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 49-70, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yang, Yuwen & Cullen, Ross & Hearnshaw, Edward & Macdonald, Ian A., 2014. "An evaluation of self-governance in the New Zealand Bluff oyster fishery – The indicator system approach," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 273-282.
    2. Emmanuelle Quillérou & Olivier Guyader, 2012. "What is behind fleet evolution: a framework for flow analysis and application to the French Atlantic fleet," Post-Print hal-00815466, HAL.
    3. Emmanuelle Quillérou & Nolwenn Roudaut & Olivier Guyader, 2013. "Managing fleet capacity effectively under second-hand market redistribution," Post-Print hal-00835574, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Townsend, Ralph E., 2010. "Transactions costs as an obstacle to fisheries self-governance in New Zealand," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 54(3), pages 1-20.
    2. De Alessi, Michael & Sullivan, Joseph M. & Hilborn, Ray, 2014. "The legal, regulatory, and institutional evolution of fishing cooperatives in Alaska and the West Coast of the United States," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 217-225.
    3. Costello, Christopher & Quérou, Nicolas & Tomini, Agnes, 2015. "Partial enclosure of the commons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 69-78.
    4. Gary D. Libecap, 2018. "Property Rights to Frontier Land and Minerals: US Exceptionalism," NBER Working Papers 24544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Edwards, Steven F., 2003. "Property rights to multi-attribute fishery resources," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2-3), pages 309-323, March.
    6. Brown Matthew & Cardiff-Hicks Brianna, 2018. "The Tragedy of the Uncommons," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-22, July.
    7. Bhattacharya, Haimanti & Lueck, Dean, 2009. "The role of property rights in determining the environmental quality-income relationship," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(10), pages 2511-2524, August.
    8. Liu, Jing & Qin, Tianbao, 2018. "A Comparative Analysis of Fishing Rights From a Transaction Cost Perspective," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 89-99.
    9. Bruce Yandle, 1982. "Conflicting commons," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 317-327, January.
    10. Elinor Ostrom, 1989. "Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 1(1), pages 11-50, July.
    11. Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2002. "Resource-based and property rights perspectives on value creation: the case of oil field unitization," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(4-5), pages 225-245.
    12. Gary D. Libecap, 2018. "Douglass C. North: Transaction Costs, Property Rights, and Economic Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 24585, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Coglan, Louisa & Pascoe, Sean, 2015. "Corporate-cooperative management of fisheries: A potential alternative governance structure for low value small fisheries?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 27-35.
    14. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2008. "A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach," Working Papers 08-0108, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    15. Barnes, James N. & James, Harvey S., Jr. & Kalaitzandonakes, Nicholas G., 2004. "The Coase Theorem, or the Coasian Lens? An Application to GMO Regulation," 2004 Annual Meeting, February 14-18, 2004, Tulsa, Oklahoma 34640, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    16. Hotte, Louis & McFerrin, Randy & Wills, Douglas, 2013. "On the dual nature of weak property rights," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 659-678.
    17. Nolde Nielsen, Kåre & Holm, Petter & Aschan, Michaela, 2015. "Results based management in fisheries: Delegating responsibility to resource users," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 442-451.
    18. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 227-253, April.
    19. Bruno Drouot, 2012. "Les facteurs explicatifs de la dépendance économique des patrons pêcheurs à une ressource naturelle : le cas de la pêcherie de bar commun en France," Post-Print hal-01870830, HAL.
    20. James J. Chrisman & Kristen Madison & Taewoo Kim, 2021. "A Dynamic Framework of Noneconomic Goals and Inter-Family Agency Complexities in Multi-Family Firms," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 45(4), pages 906-930, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ajarec:v:54:y:2010:i:3:p:301-320. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aaresea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.