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Corporate Governance and Firm Financial Performance: Do Ownership and Board Size Matter?

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  • Stephen Oluwafemi Adeusi
  • Niyi Israel Akeke
  • Foluso Olugbenga Aribaba
  • Obawale Simeon Adebisi
Abstract
Using a sample of 10 selected banks annual reports covering 2005-2010, this study examines the relationship between corporate governance and performance in Nigeria banking sector. Based on the econometric model, the result indicates that improved performance of the banking sector is not dependent on increasing the number of executive directors and board composition. It shows further that when there are more external board members, performance of banks tends to be worse. The study concludes a need for increase in board size and decrease in board composition as measured by the ratio of outside directors to the total number of directors in order to increase the bank performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Oluwafemi Adeusi & Niyi Israel Akeke & Foluso Olugbenga Aribaba & Obawale Simeon Adebisi, 2013. "Corporate Governance and Firm Financial Performance: Do Ownership and Board Size Matter?," Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, Richtmann Publishing Ltd, vol. 2, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bjz:ajisjr:157
    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5901/ajis.2013.v2n3p251
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    References listed on IDEAS

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