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Rules versus Discretion: A Reconsideration

Author

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  • Narayana Kocherlakota

    (University of Rochester)

Abstract
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Suggested Citation

  • Narayana Kocherlakota, 2016. "Rules versus Discretion: A Reconsideration," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 47(2 (Fall)), pages 1-55.
    • Handle: RePEc:bin:bpeajo:v:47:y:2016:i:2016-02:p:1-55
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    File URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/kocherlakotatextfall16bpea.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226519999 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-1070, December.
    3. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1997. "Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1111-1146, June.
    4. Lars E.O. Svensson & Robert J. Tetlow, 2005. "Optimal Policy Projections," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(3), December.
    5. Williams, John C., 2013. "A defense of moderation in monetary policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 38(PB), pages 137-150.
    6. Ali Alichi & Kevin Clinton & Charles Freedman & Mr. Ondrej Kamenik & Michel Juillard & Mr. Douglas Laxton & Mr. Jarkko Turunen & Hou Wang, 2015. "Avoiding Dark Corners: A Robust Monetary Policy Framework for the United States," IMF Working Papers 2015/134, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Karl Brunner & Allan H. Meltzer, 1968. "What Did We Learn from the Monetary Experience of the United States in the Great Depression?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 1(2), pages 334-348, May.
    8. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
    9. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
    10. Bordo,Michael D. & Roberds,William (ed.), 2013. "The Origins, History, and Future of the Federal Reserve," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107013728, September.
    11. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Barthélemy, Jean & Mengus, Eric, 2018. "The signaling effect of raising inflation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 488-516.
    2. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 2019. "Practical policy evaluation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 29-45.
    3. Jeffrey Campbell & Jacob Weber, 2021. "Discretion rather than rules: Equilibrium uniqueness and forward guidance with inconsistent optimal plans," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 41, pages 243-254, July.
    4. Marina Halac & Pierre Yared, 2022. "Instrument-Based versus Target-Based Rules," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(1), pages 312-345.

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