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Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Klenio Barbosa
  • Dakshina G. De Silva
  • Liyu Yang
  • Hisayuki Yoshimoto
Abstract
This paper exploits a large-scale auction experiment conducted by two Chinese government treasury security issuers—the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank—to investigate whether treasury securities should be sold through uniform price or discriminatory price auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different. Further, these estimates indicate there is no significant economic difference in terms of revenue between the two auction mechanisms. This result is robust across different bond yield-rate measurements and participation behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Klenio Barbosa & Dakshina G. De Silva & Liyu Yang & Hisayuki Yoshimoto, 2022. "Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 394-419, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:4:p:394-419
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200216
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Hubbard, Timothy P. & Schiller, Anita R. & Tsionas, Mike G., 2023. "Estimating outcomes in the presence of endogeneity and measurement error with an application to R&D," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 278-294.
    2. Balmford, Ben & Collins, Joseph & Day, Brett & Lindsay, Luke & Peacock, James, 2023. "Pricing rules for PES auctions: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    3. Mariño, Eduardo Anthony G. & Marszalec, Daniel, 2023. "Strategic supply management and mechanism choice in government debt auctions: An empirical analysis from the Philippines," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • P34 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Finance

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