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A Theory of Patent Portfolios

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Listed:
  • Jay Pil Choi
  • Heiko Gerlach
Abstract
This paper develops a theory of patent portfolios in which firms accumulate an enormous amount of related patents, which makes it impractical to develop new products that avoid inadvertent infringement. We show that patent peace arises if product market competition is weak and patent portfolios are either sufficiently weak or sufficiently strong with comparable size. An increase in one firm's patent portfolio reduces the innovation incentives of its rivals but does not necessarily increase its own. Firms with larger patent portfolios have stronger incentives to acquire additional patents, while consumers may be better off if firms with weaker portfolios acquire them.

Suggested Citation

  • Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2017. "A Theory of Patent Portfolios," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 315-351, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:1:p:315-51
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2018. "A Model Of Patent Trolls," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 2075-2106, November.
    2. Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2017. "A Theory of Patent Portfolios," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 315-351, February.
    3. Stefano Comino & Fabio M. Manenti, 2022. "Patent portfolios and firms’ technological choices," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 137(2), pages 97-120, October.
    4. Choi, Jay Pil & Gerlach, Heiko, 2019. "Optimal cross-licensing arrangements: Collusion versus entry deterrence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    5. Carlo Capuano & Iacopo Grassi & Riccardo Martina, 2020. "Patent protection and threat of litigation in oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 130(2), pages 109-131, July.
    6. Norbäck Pehr-Johan & Olofsson Charlotta & Persson Lars, 2020. "Acquisitions for Sleep," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-13, April.
    7. Bar, Talia & Kalinowski, Jesse, 2019. "Patent validity and the timing of settlements," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    8. Bergeaud, Antonin & Schmidt, Juliane & Zago, Riccardo, 2022. "Patents that match your standards: firm-level evidence on competition and innovation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118031, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Kwon, Seokbeom & Marco, Alan C., 2021. "Can antitrust law enforcement spur innovation? Antitrust regulation of patent consolidation and its impact on follow-on innovations," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(9).
    10. Gabrovski, Miroslav, 2023. "Coordination frictions and economic growth," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(6), pages 1528-1548, September.
    11. Klapper, Felix B. & Siemering, Christian, 2024. "Effects of patent privateering on settlements and R&D under sequential market entry," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    12. Yao, Li & Li, Jun & Chen, Kaihua & Yu, Rongjian, 2024. "Winning the second race of technology standardization: Strategic maneuvers in SEP follow-on innovations," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(6).
    13. He, Leshui, 2020. "A theory of pre-filing settlement and patent assertion entities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    14. Bergeaud Antonin & Schmidt Julia & Zago Riccardo, 2022. "Patents that Match your Standards: Firm-level Evidence on Competition and Growth," Working papers 876, Banque de France.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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