Sovereign Debt Restructuring
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282803321946831
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Bai, Yan & Zhang, Jing, 2012.
"Duration of sovereign debt renegotiation,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 252-268.
- Yan Bai & Jing Zhang, 2009. "Duration of Sovereign Debt Renegotiation," Working Papers 593, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
- Daniels, Kenneth & Ramirez, Gabriel G., 2007. "Debt restructurings, holdouts, and exit consents," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 1-17, April.
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