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How Would Medicare for All Affect Health System Capacity? Evidence from Medicare for Some

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  • Jeffrey Clemens
  • Joshua D. Gottlieb
  • Jeffrey Hicks
Abstract
Proposals to create a national health care plan such as “Medicare for All” rely heavily on reducing the prices that insurers pay for health care. These changes affect physicians’ short-run incentives for care provision and may also change health care providers’ incentives to invest in capacity, thereby influencing the availability of care in the long term. We provide evidence on these responses using a major Medicare payment change combined with survey data on physicians’ time use. We find evidence that physicians increase their time spent on capacity building when remuneration increases, and that they are subsequently more willing to accept new patients—especially those who may be the residual claimants on marginal capacity. These forces imply that short-run supply curves likely differ from long-run supply curves. Policymakers need to account for how major changes to payment incentives would influence the investments that determine health system capacity.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottlieb & Jeffrey Hicks, 2021. "How Would Medicare for All Affect Health System Capacity? Evidence from Medicare for Some," Tax Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 225-262.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:tpolec:doi:10.1086/713497
    DOI: 10.1086/713497
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    Cited by:

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    2. Garthwaite, Craig & Ody, Christopher & Starc, Amanda, 2022. "Endogenous quality investments in the U.S. hospital market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    3. Jeffrey P. Clemens & Jonathan M. Leganza & Alex Masucci, 2021. "Plugging Gaps in Payment Systems: Evidence from the Take-Up of New Medicare Billing Codes," CESifo Working Paper Series 9209, CESifo.
    4. Jeffrey Clemens & Pierre-Thomas Léger & Yashna Nandan & Robert Town, 2024. "Physician Practice Preferences and Healthcare Expenditures: Evidence from Commercial Payers," NBER Working Papers 33090, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Kelli Marquardt, 2024. "Liran Einav and Amy Finkelstein: We’ve got you covered: rebooting American health care," Business Economics, Palgrave Macmillan;National Association for Business Economics, vol. 59(3), pages 190-192, July.
    6. Mauro, Marianna & Giancotti, Monica, 2021. "Italian responses to the COVID-19 emergency: Overthrowing 30 years of health reforms?," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 125(4), pages 548-552.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private

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