A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations
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DOI: 10.1086/467889
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Cited by:
- Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1998. "Chapter 11," NBER Working Papers 6473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 475-485, April.
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"The Impact of Legal Sanctions on Moral Hazard when Debt Contracts are Renegotiable,"
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06-09, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
- Régis Blazy & Laurent Weill, 2007. "The impact of legal sanctions on moral hazard when debt contracts are renegotiable?," DULBEA Working Papers 07-06.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Régis Blazy & Laurent Weill, 2007. "The impact of legal sanctions on moral hazard when debt contracts are renegotiable?," Working Papers CEB 07-012.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Dinev, Nikolay, 2017. "Voluntary Bankruptcy as Preemptive Persuasion," Economics Series 334, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Stefan Wielenberg, 2001. "Strategisches Verhalten bei der Unternehmenssanierung durch außergerichtlichen Vergleich," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 53(6), pages 605-631, September.
- John F. Crean, 2009. "Credit Risk, Default Loss, and the Economics of Bankruptcy," Working Papers tecipa-354, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Tarbalouti, Essaid, 2013. "Defaut De Paiement, Comportement De Sauve-Qui-Peut Et Traitement Des Creanciers [Default, Behavior Opportunistic And Treatment Of The Creditors]," MPRA Paper 56631, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Efraim Benmelech & Nittai K. Bergman, 2008.
"Liquidation Values and the Credibility of Financial Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from U.S. Airlines,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(4), pages 1635-1677.
- Efraim Benmelech & Nittai K. Bergman, 2008. "Liquidation Values and the Credibility of Financial Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from U.S. Airlines," NBER Working Papers 14059, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hülya K. K. Eraslan, 2008. "Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Estimates From A Bargaining Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(2), pages 659-681, May.
- Xavier Giné & Inessa Love, 2010.
"Do Reorganization Costs Matter for Efficiency? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Reform in Colombia,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 833-864.
- Gine, Xavier & Love, Inessa, 2006. "Do reorganization costs matter for efficiency ? Evidence from a bankruptcy reform in Colombia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3970, The World Bank.
- Elie Appelbaum, 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, Bankruptcy and the Firm’s Capital Structure," Working Papers 2007_06, York University, Department of Economics.
- S. Alex Yang & John R. Birge & Rodney P. Parker, 2015. "The Supply Chain Effects of Bankruptcy," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(10), pages 2320-2338, October.
- Edward R. Morrison, 2009. "Bargaining around Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts and State Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 255-307, June.
- Blazy, Régis & Deffains, Bruno & Umbhauer, Gisèle & Weill, Laurent, 2013.
"Severe or gentle bankruptcy law: Which impact on investing and financing decisions?,"
Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 129-144.
- Régis Blazy & Bruno Deffains & Gisele Umbhauer & Laurent Weill, 2013. "Severe or gentle bankruptcy law : Which impact on investing and financing decisions ?," Post-Print hal-01753883, HAL.
- Jianjun Yu & Dan Zhu, 2018. "Study on the Selection Strategy of Supply Chain Financing Modes Based on the Retailer’s Trade Grade," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(9), pages 1-12, August.
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