What Do Revolving-Door Laws Do?
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DOI: 10.1086/663630
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- Xiaoyan Chen & Allan Hodgson & Martina K. Linnenluecke, 2018. "Transferring and trading on insider information in the United States and Australia: just a case of happy hour drinks?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 58(S1), pages 83-95, November.
- David M. Reeb & Yuzhao Zhang & Wanli Zhao, 2014. "Insider Trading in Supervised Industries," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(3), pages 529-559.
- Sounman Hong & Jeehun Lim, 2016. "Capture and the bureaucratic mafia: does the revolving door erode bureaucratic integrity?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 69-86, January.
- Liu, Xiaoge & Miao, Miao & Liu, Ruiming, 2020. "Litigation and corporate risk taking: Evidence from Chinese listed firms," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
- Marc T. Law & Cheryl X. Long, 2011. "Revolving door laws and state public utility commissioners," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(4), pages 405-424, December.
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