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Central bank independence, inflation and political instability in developing countries

Author

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  • Jakob De Haan
  • Clemens L.J. Siermann
Abstract
We test whether political instability affects central bank independence in developing countries. Both a legal measure and the turnover tate of central bank governors are used as proxies for central bank independence and the frequency of government transfers is used to proxy political instability. Only the number of coups affects the turnover rate of central bank governors. We also find that both the turnover rate of central bank governors and political instability affect the rate of inflation.

Suggested Citation

  • Jakob De Haan & Clemens L.J. Siermann, 1996. "Central bank independence, inflation and political instability in developing countries," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 135-147.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jpolrf:v:1:y:1996:i:2:p:135-147
    DOI: 10.1080/13841289608523360
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    Cited by:

    1. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Rodriguez, Cesar M., 2020. "More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 87-105.
    2. Pavel Trunin & Kniazev Dmitriy & Satdarov Alexandr, 2010. "Analysis of independence of the central banks of the Russian Federation, the CIS and East European countries," Research Paper Series, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, issue 133P.
    3. Sven-Olov Daunfeldt & Jörgen Hellström & Mats Landström, 2013. "Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 41(4), pages 427-438, December.
    4. Mr. Marc G Quintyn & Sophia Gollwitzer, 2010. "The Effectiveness of Macroeconomic Commitment in Weak(er) Institutional Environments," IMF Working Papers 2010/193, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Eichler, Stefan & Littke, Helge C.N. & Tonzer, Lena, 2017. "Central bank transparency and cross-border banking," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 1-30.
    6. Afees A. Salisu & Elias A. Udeaja & Silva Opuala-Charles, 2022. "Central Bank Independence And Price Stability Under Alternative Political Regimes: A Global Evidence," Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Bank Indonesia, vol. 25(2), pages 155-172, August.
    7. Brumm, Harold J., 2011. "Inflation and central bank independence: Two-way causality?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(3), pages 220-222, June.
    8. Eva Gutiérrez, 2004. "Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence. Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean," Economía Mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, CIDE, División de Economía, vol. 0(2), pages 255-287, July-Dece.
    9. Ana Carolina Garriga, 2016. "Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(5), pages 849-868, October.
    10. Aziz N. Berdiev & James W. Saunoris, 2023. "The case for independence: Does central bank independence curb the spread of the underground economy?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(3), pages 407-435, August.
    11. Jeroen Klomp & Jakob De Haan, 2010. "Inflation And Central Bank Independence: A Meta‐Regression Analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 593-621, September.
    12. Haan, Jakob de & Kooi, Willem J., 2000. "Does central bank independence really matter?: New evidence for developing countries using a new indicator," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 643-664, April.
    13. Miss Eva Gutierrez, 2003. "Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence: Evidence From Latin America and the Caribbean," IMF Working Papers 2003/053, International Monetary Fund.

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