[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/zewdip/12062.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Forward integration and market entry: Evidence from natural gas markets for household customers in Germany

Author

Listed:
  • Nikogosian, Vigen
  • Weigand, Jürgen
Abstract
Due to potential abuse of the market power at wholesale and retail market level for natural gas the Federal Cartel Office in Germany prohibited further forward integration of gas importing firms with retail incumbents from 2005/2006 to 2010. The Authority argued that the very few dominant gas importing companies, which also own and operate the gas pipelines, could have an incentive to foreclose existing competitors or prevent potential market entry. However, two of the importing companies remained extensively forward integrated. To analyze possible forward integration issues empirically we employ cross sectional data (for September 2009) for about 500 sub markets for household customers in Germany. These submarkets have different vertical ownership structures. Our data set contains information on ownership and market entry. By applying a market entry model, which is based on the framework introduced by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), we do not find clear evidence that market entry is restricted by forward integration of gas importers and retail incumbents.

Suggested Citation

  • Nikogosian, Vigen & Weigand, Jürgen, 2012. "Forward integration and market entry: Evidence from natural gas markets for household customers in Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 12-062, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12062
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/66117/1/729442098.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Catherine Schaumans & Frank Verboven, 2015. "Entry and Competition in Differentiated Products Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 97(1), pages 195-209, March.
    2. Justine S. Hastings & Richard J. Gilbert, 2005. "Market Power, Vertical Integration And The Wholesale Price Of Gasoline," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 469-492, December.
    3. Jean Marie Abraham & Martin Gaynor & William B. Vogt, 2007. "Entry And Competition In Local Hospital Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 265-288, June.
    4. Tasneem Chipty, 2001. "Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 428-453, June.
    5. Berry, Steven T, 1992. "Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 889-917, July.
    6. Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, 1999. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio Broadcasting," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(3), pages 397-420, Autumn.
    7. Growitsch, Christian & Wein, Thomas, 2005. "Network access charges, vertical integration, and property rights structure--experiences from the German electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 257-278, March.
    8. Silke J. Forbes & Mara Lederman, 2010. "Does vertical integration affect firm performance? Evidence from the airline industry," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(4), pages 765-790, December.
    9. Bortolotti, Bernardo & Cambini, Carlo & Rondi, Laura & Spiegel, Yossi, 2007. "Capital Structure and Regulation: Does Ownership Matter?," Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance Working Papers 7449, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    10. Severin Borenstein, 1985. "Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 380-397, Autumn.
    11. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 629-685, September.
    12. Ferrari, Stijn & Verboven, Frank, 2010. "Empirical analysis of markets with free and restricted entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 403-406, July.
    13. Peter C. Reiss & Matthew W. White, 2005. "Household Electricity Demand, Revisited," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(3), pages 853-883.
    14. Nikogosian, Vigen & Veith, Tobias, 2011. "Vertical integration, separation and non-price discrimination: An empirical analysis of German electricity markets for residential customers," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-069, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nishida, Mitsukuni & Gil, Ricard, 2014. "Regulation, enforcement, and entry: Evidence from the Spanish local TV industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 11-23.
    2. Laura Alfaro & Nick Bloom & Paola Conconi & Harald Fadinger & Patrick Legros & Andrew F Newman & Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen, 2024. "Come Together: Firm Boundaries and Delegation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 22(1), pages 34-72.
    3. Stijn Ferrari & Frank Verboven & Hans Degryse, 2010. "Investment and Usage of New Technologies: Evidence from a Shared ATM Network," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 1046-1079, June.
    4. Philip G. Gayle, 2013. "On the Efficiency of Codeshare Contracts between Airlines: Is Double Marginalization Eliminated?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 244-273, November.
    5. An-Hsiang Liu & Ralph Siebert, 2020. "The Competitive Effects of Declining Entry Costs over Time: Evidence from the Static Random Access Memory Market," CESifo Working Paper Series 8552, CESifo.
    6. Johannes Boehm & Jan Sonntag, 2023. "Vertical Integration and Foreclosure: Evidence from Production Network Data," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 141-161, January.
    7. Emmanuel Dhyne & Ayumu Ken Kikkawa & Glenn Magerman, 2022. "Imperfect Competition in Firm-to-Firm Trade," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 20(5), pages 1933-1970.
    8. Liu, An-Hsiang & Siebert, Ralph B., 2022. "The competitive effects of declining entry costs over time: Evidence from the static random access memory market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    9. Fitzová, Hana & Kališ, Richard & Pařil, Vilém & Fila, Milan, 2024. "Entry and competition in the European bike-sharing industry," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 100-107.
    10. Castellari Elena & Bonanno Alessandro & Sckokai Paolo, 2019. "Food Retail Liberalization, Food Retail Structure and Food Prices: The Italian Case," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 17(2), pages 1-11, November.
    11. Nikogosian, Vigen & Veith, Tobias, 2011. "Strategic pricing, market entry and competition: Evidence from German electricity submarkets," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-068, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    12. Thomas Hutzschenreuter & Florian Gröne, 2009. "Changing Vertical Integration Strategies under Pressure from Foreign Competition: The Case of US and German Multinationals," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 269-307, March.
    13. Mitsuru Sunada, 2010. "Vertical Integration in the Japanese Movie Industry," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 135-150, June.
    14. In Kyung Kim & Vladyslav Nora, 2017. "Does Vertical Integration Enhance Non-Price Efficiency? Evidence from the Movie Theater Industry," Working Papers 1701, Nazarbayev University, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2018.
    15. Gayle, Philip G. & Harrison, Teresa D. & Thornton, Jeremy, 2017. "Entry, donor market size, and competitive conduct among nonprofit firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 294-318.
    16. Jaideep Shenoy, 2012. "An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical Takeovers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(8), pages 1482-1501, August.
    17. Markus Reisinger & Emanuele Tarantino, 2015. "Vertical integration, foreclosure, and productive efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(3), pages 461-479, September.
    18. In Kyung Kim & Vladyslav Nora, 2020. "Does vertical integration enhance non-price efficiency? Evidence from the movie theater industry," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(3), pages 143-170, December.
    19. Peter Eppinger & Hong Ma, 2023. "Optimal Ownership and Firm Performance: An Analysis of China’s FDI Liberalization," CESifo Working Paper Series 10551, CESifo.
    20. Marissa Beck & Fiona Scott Morton, 2021. "Evaluating the Evidence on Vertical Mergers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(2), pages 273-302, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    energy markets; natural gas; market entry; forward integration; vertical integration; market foreclosure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12062. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/zemande.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.