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Öffentliche Investitionen: Die Schuldenbremse ist nicht das Problem

Author

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  • Feld, Lars P.
  • Reuter, Wolf Heinrich
  • Yeter, Mustafa
Abstract
Es gibt öffentliche Investitionsbedarfe in Deutschland, etwa zur Bewältigung des Strukturwandels, im Rahmen der Klimapolitik oder der öffentlichen Infrastruktur. Deren genaue Höhe ist jedoch äußerst unsicher. Einer Erhöhung der Investitionen stehen die ausgelasteten Kapazitäten in der Bauwirtschaft und den Planungsämtern, kommunale Finanzprobleme sowie Regulierungen und lange Verfahrensdauern entgegen. Die sprunghafte Erhöhung der Investitionsausgaben in künftigen Haushaltsplänen durch eine Änderung oder Umgehung der Schuldenbremse dürfte nicht zu entsprechend höheren realen Investitionen führen. Vielmehr ist davon auszugehen, dass wie in den vergangenen Jahren die Preise steigen und überschüssige Mittel von einem ins nächste Jahr verschoben werden. Die Schuldenbremse bietet derzeit genug Spielräume für eine schrittweise Steigerung der Investitionen, die angesichts der Hindernisse und Unsicherheiten angezeigt ist. Die Änderung oder Umgehung der Schuldenbremse ist in der Diskussion um öffentliche Investitionen derzeit fehlplatziert. Vielmehr besteht die Gefahr, die Glaubwürdigkeit der europäischen Fiskalregeln aufs Spiel zu setzen, die für das Funktionieren der Europäischen Währungsunion und die unabhängige Geldpolitik notwendig sind.

Suggested Citation

  • Feld, Lars P. & Reuter, Wolf Heinrich & Yeter, Mustafa, 2020. "Öffentliche Investitionen: Die Schuldenbremse ist nicht das Problem," Working Papers 01/2020, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:svrwwp:012020
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    Cited by:

    1. Christoph M. Schmidt, 2020. "The German Debt Brake on Trial: Not Guilty," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 21(01), pages 35-40, April.
    2. Michael Hüther & Markos Jung, 2021. "Unzureichende Investitionsoffensive," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 101(3), pages 158-161, March.
    3. Diermeier, Matthias & Hüther, Michael & Obst, Thomas, 2021. "Wunsch und Wirklichkeit: Kaum Ausgabenspielräume in der neuen Legislaturperiode. Zwischen Schuldenbremse und Steuererhöhungen," IW-Reports 33/2021, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) / German Economic Institute.
    4. Lars P. Feld & Martin Beznoska & Oliver Holtemöller & Hans-Peter Burghof & Ulrike Neyer & Clemens Fuest & Friedrich Heinemann & Thomas König, 2020. "Rekordschulden gegen Corona-Folgen – was kann sich der Staat leisten?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 73(08), pages 03-32, August.
    5. Sebastian Blesse & Florian Dorn & Max Lay, 2023. "Do Fiscal Rules Undermine Public Investments? A Review of Empirical Evidence," ifo Working Paper Series 393, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    6. Blesse, Sebastian & Heinemann, Friedrich & Janeba, Eckhard & Nover, Justus, 2021. "Landtagspolitiker stehen zur Schuldenbremse bei wachsender Unterstützung für Investitionsklausel: Ergebnisse einer Umfrage zur grundgesetzlichen Schuldenbremse und möglichen Reformansätzen," ZEW Expert Briefs 21-01, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    7. Truger, Achim, 2020. "Kreditfinanzierung (zusätzlicher) öffentlicher Investitionen sinnvoll," ifso expertise 4, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute for Socioeconomics (ifso).
    8. Ludger Schuknecht & Christoph A. Schaltegger & Michele Salvi & Jan Schnellenbach & Thomas Lenk & Christian Bender & Mario Hesse & Gert G. Wagner & Stefan Korioth & Klaus Gründler & Philipp Heil & Nikl, 2021. "Zankapfel Schuldenbremse: Bewährtes Instrument auch in Krisenzeiten?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 74(04), pages 03-30, April.
    9. Matthias Diermeier & Michael Hüther & Thomas Obst, 2021. "Ausgabenspielräume der Bundesregierung: zwischen Schuldenbremse und Steuererhöhung [Fiscal Policy of the Federal Government: Between a Debt Brake and Tax Increases]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 101(9), pages 692-699, September.
    10. Kersten Kellermann & Carsten-Henning Schlag, 2021. "Überakkumulation oder Investitionslücke? [Over Accumulation or Investment Gap?]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 101(12), pages 964-970, December.
    11. Felix Rösel & Julia Wolffson, 2022. "Chronischer Investitionsmangel — eine deutsche Krankheit [Chronic Lack of Investment — a German Disease]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 102(7), pages 529-533, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Schuldenbremse; öffentliche Verschuldung; öffentliche Investitionen; Kapazitätsengpässe;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures

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