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The Political Economy of the Decline in Antitrust Enforcement in the United States

Author

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  • Lancieri, Filippo
  • Posner, Eric
  • Zingales, Luigi
Abstract
Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. We investigate the political causes of this decline by looking at who made the crucial decisions and the strength of their popular mandate. Using a novel framework to understand the determinants of regulatory capture and several new datasets, we find that there was no public support for the weakening of antitrust enforcement. The decline in antitrust enforcement was the result of a collection of technocratic decisions made in politically unaccountable ways, mostly by regulators and judges. Behind the scenes, big business played a major role in influencing these agents; but other factors (like the increase in private sector pay relative to government pay) and intellectual currents mattered as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Lancieri, Filippo & Posner, Eric & Zingales, Luigi, 2022. "The Political Economy of the Decline in Antitrust Enforcement in the United States," Working Papers 315, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:315
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/262717/1/wp315.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Trebbi & Miao Ben Zhang, 2022. "The Cost of Regulatory Compliance in the United States," NBER Working Papers 30691, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Javier D. Donna & Pedro Pereira, 2024. "Structural Presumptions for Non-horizontal Mergers in the 2023 Merger Guidelines: A Primer and a Path Forward," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(1), pages 303-345, August.
    3. Olimpia Cutinelli Rendina, 2023. "Lobbying or Innovation: Who Does What Against Foreign Competition," Working Papers halshs-03970033, HAL.
    4. Christian Reiner & Christian Bellak, 2023. "Hat die ökonomische Macht von Unternehmen in Österreich zugenommen? Teil 1," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 49(1), pages 21-59.

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