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Independent Central Banks: Low inflation at no cost?: A model with fiscal policy

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  • Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat
  • Manzano, Carolina
Abstract
In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal policy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that, with this extension, the politically induced variance of output is not always eliminated nor reduced by delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative central bank. Further, in flation and output stabilisation will be affected by the degree of conservativeness of the central bank and by the probability of the less in flation averse party gaining power. Keywords: rational partisan theory; fiscal policy; independent central bank JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.

Suggested Citation

  • Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat & Manzano, Carolina, 2013. "Independent Central Banks: Low inflation at no cost?: A model with fiscal policy," Working Papers 2072/222196, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/222196
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 169-179, March.
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    1. Ferré, Montserrat & Manzano, Carolina, 2022. "The macroeconomic impact of radical right populist parties in government," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bancs centrals; Política fiscal; Política monetària; 336 - Finances. Banca. Moneda. Borsa;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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