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Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study

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Abstract
We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intending defectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Esther Hauk & Rosemarie Nagel, 2000. "Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers 487, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:487
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    Cited by:

    1. Kenju Kamei & Louis Putterman, 2013. "Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning in Restarting, Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games," Working Papers 2013-8, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    2. Simon Gächter & Christian Thöni, 2005. "Social Learning and Voluntary Cooperation Among Like-Minded People," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 303-314, 04/05.
    3. S. K. Berninghaus & Werner Gueth & Katinka Pantz & Bodo Vogt, 2004. "Evolution of Spontaneous Social Exchange - An Experimental Study -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-17, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    4. Harmsen - van Hout, M.J.W. & Dellaert, B.G.C. & Herings, P.J.J., 2008. "Behavorial effects in individual decisions of network formation," Research Memorandum 019, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    5. repec:cup:judgdm:v:4:y:2009:i:5:p:363-384 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Yoella Bereby-Meyer & Alvin E. Roth, 2006. "The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1029-1042, September.
    7. Elinor Ostrom, 2010. "Analyzing collective action," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 41(s1), pages 155-166, November.
    8. Maria Bigoni & Marco Casari & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015. "Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 587-616, March.
    9. Hå Holm & Peter Engseld, 2005. "Choosing Bargaining Partners—An Experimental Study on the Impact of Information About Income, Status and Gender," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 8(3), pages 183-216, September.
    10. Esther Hauk, 2003. "Multiple Prisoner's Dilemma Games with(out) an Outside Option: an Experimental Study," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 207-229, May.
    11. Giorgio Coricelli & Dietmar Fehr & Gerlinde Fellner, 2004. "Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(3), pages 356-378, June.
    12. Howard Kunreuther & Gabriel Silvasi & Eric T. Bradlow & Dylan Small, 2007. "Deterministic and Stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Experiments in Interdependent Security," NBER Technical Working Papers 0341, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Howard Kunreuther & Gabriel Silvasi & Eric T. Bradlow & Dylan Small, 2009. "Bayesian analysis of deterministic and stochastic prisoner's dilemma games," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 4(5), pages 363-384, August.
    14. Daniel Friedman & Ryan Oprea, 2012. "A Continuous Dilemma," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 337-363, February.
    15. Corbae, Dean & Duffy, John, 2008. "Experiments with network formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 81-120, September.
    16. John Duffy & Dean Corbae, 2006. "Experiments with Network Formation," Working Paper 292, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Aug 2007.
    17. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2010. "Exit, collective action and polycentric political systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(3), pages 339-352, June.
    18. Friedman, Daniel & Oprea, Ryan, 2009. "A Continuous Dilemma ∗," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3475m3dq, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    19. Claudia Keser & Claude Montmarquette, 2011. "Voluntary versus Enforced Team Effort," Games, MDPI, vol. 2(3), pages 1-25, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Prisoner's dilemma; partner selection; experiments; multiple games; Leex;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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