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Choosing an Electoral Rule: Values and Self-Interest in the Lab

Author

Listed:
  • Damien Bol
  • André Blais
  • Maxime Coulombe
  • Jean François Laslier
  • Jean-Benoît Pilet
Abstract
We study the choice of multi-person bargaining protocols in the context of politics. In politics, citizens are increasingly involved in the design of democratic rules, for instance via referendums. If they support the rule that best serves their self-interest, the outcome inevitably advantages the largest group. In this paper, we challenge this pessimistic view with an original lab experiment, in which 252 subjects participated. In the first stage, these subjects experience elections under plurality and approval voting. In the second stage, they decide which rule they want to use for extra elections. We find that egalitarian values that subjects hold outside of the lab shape their choice of electoral rule in the second stage when a rule led to a fairer distribution of payoffs compared to the other one in the first stage. The implication is that people have consistent ‘value-driven preferences’ for decision rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Damien Bol & André Blais & Maxime Coulombe & Jean François Laslier & Jean-Benoît Pilet, 2023. "Choosing an Electoral Rule: Values and Self-Interest in the Lab," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/355145, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/355145
    Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Durand, François & Macé, Antonin & Núñez, Matías, 2024. "Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 1-34.
    2. Carina I. Hausladen & Regula Hänggli Fricker & Dirk Helbing & Renato Kunz & Junling Wang & Evangelos Pournaras, 2024. "How voting rules impact legitimacy," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-10, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    lab experiment; choice of decision rules; electoral rules; voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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