Focality is Intuitive - Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Time Pressure in Coordination Games
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- Sonntag, Axel & Poulsen, Anders, 2019. "Focality is intuitive - Experimental evidence on the effects of time pressure in coordination games," MPRA Paper 92262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Coordination game; focal point; time pressure; response times; social heuristics hypothesis; experiment.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2019-03-25 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2019-03-25 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2019-03-25 (Game Theory)
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