[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/uct/uconnp/2011-12.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Law and Economics of International Cooperation Against Maritime Piracy

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Hallwood

    (University of Connecticut)

  • Thomas J. Miceli

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract
Article 100 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea requires signatories to “cooperate” against maritime piracy, but “cooperate” is undefined. Enforcement is a public good – creating uncompensated benefits for others, so suffering from free-rider problems. Our analysis readily explains why more pirates captured are released than prosecuted; why the U.N. and International Maritime Organization are seeking to reduce enforcement costs; why some in the shipping industry want to apply the 1988 Convention against terrorism at sea; and why still others want to move prosecution of pirates out of national courts to an international court.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Hallwood & Thomas J. Miceli, 2011. "The Law and Economics of International Cooperation Against Maritime Piracy," Working papers 2011-12, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2011-12
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://media.economics.uconn.edu/working/2011-12.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Boadway, Robin & Marceau, Nicolas & Marchand, Maurice, 1996. "Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 51(2), pages 149-165.
    3. Matthew Baker & Thomas Miceli, 2005. "Credible Criminal Enforcement," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 5-15, July.
    4. Poret, Sylvaine, 2002. "Paradoxical effects of law enforcement policies: the case of the illicit drug market," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 465-493, December.
    5. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December.
    6. Naranjo, Alberto J., 2010. "Spillover effects of domestic law enforcement policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 265-275, September.
    7. Paul Hallwood & Thomas J. Miceli, 2011. "“Keystone Cops” Meet “Pirates of the Somali Coast”: The Failure of International Efforts to Control Maritime Piracy," Working papers 2011-09, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Paul Hallwood & Thomas J. Miceli, 2013. "An Economic Analysis of Maritime Piracy and its Control," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 60(4), pages 343-359, September.
    2. Paul Hallwood & Thomas J. Miceli, 2013. "An examination of some problems with international law governing maritime piracy," Maritime Policy & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(1), pages 65-79, January.
    3. Suurmond, Guido, 2007. "The effects of the enforcement strategy," MPRA Paper 21142, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Ken Yahagi, 2019. "Law enforcement with criminal organizations and endogenous collaboration," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 351-363, December.
    5. Paul Hallwood & Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Modern Maritime Piracy," Working papers 2014-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    6. Flores, Daniel, 2016. "Violence and law enforcement in markets for illegal goods," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 77-87.
    7. Jefferson DP Bertolai & Luiz GDS Scorzafave, 2021. "Property rights’ emergence in illicit drug markets," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(1), pages 52-105, February.
    8. Baker, Matthew J. & Miceli, Thomas J., 2021. "Crime, credible enforcement, and multiple equilibria," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    9. Edward M. Shepard & Paul R. Blackely, 2010. "Economics of Crime and Drugs: Prohibition and Public Policies for Illicit Drug Control," Chapters, in: Bruce L. Benson & Paul R. Zimmerman (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Crime, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Mark Koyama, 2012. "Prosecution Associations in Industrial Revolution England: Private Providers of Public Goods?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 95-130.
    11. Friehe, Tim & Miceli, Thomas J., 2015. "Focusing law enforcement when offenders can choose location," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 105-112.
    12. Poret, Sylvaine, 2009. "An optimal anti-drug law enforcement policy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 221-228, September.
    13. Mark Koyama, 2014. "The law & economics of private prosecutions in industrial revolution England," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 277-298, April.
    14. Leonardo Raffo López & José Luis Segura, 2018. "La ineficacia de las políticas de represión a la oferta de drogas: una explicación alternativa," Ensayos de Economía 16782, Universidad Nacional de Colombia Sede Medellín.
    15. Emmanuelle Auriol & Alice Mesnard, 2016. "Sale of Visas: a Smuggler's Final Song?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 646-678, October.
    16. van der Weele Joël, 2012. "Beyond the State of Nature: Introducing Social Interactions in the Economic Model of Crime," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 401-432, October.
    17. Meier, Stephan & Pierce, Lamar & Vaccaro, Antonino & La Cara, Barbara, 2016. "Trust and in-group favoritism in a culture of crime," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(PA), pages 78-92.
    18. Peter T. Leeson, 2014. ""God Damn": The Law and Economics of Monastic Malediction," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(1), pages 193-216.
    19. Ken Yahagi, 2018. "Welfare effects of forming a criminal organization," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 359-375, December.
    20. Iain W. Long, 2017. "The Storm Before the Calm? Adverse Effects of Tackling Organized Crime," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(5), pages 541-576, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    International law; law enforcement; maritime piracy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2011-12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Mark McConnel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deuctus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.