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Análisis del uso de beneficios en el Seguro de Cesantía Chileno

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Abstract
Este documento intenta caracterizar el comportamiento de uso de los beneficios del Seguro de Cesantía Chileno. A partir de datos administrativos de este programa se observa que sólo el 35% de los individuos que, siendo elegibles para beneficios y con una pausa de al menos un mes sin cotizar, solicita alguno de los beneficios que el Seguro contempla. Las explicaciones detrás de este fenómeno se agrupan usualmente en cuatro categorías: costos pecuniarios, costos de información, costos de transacción o administrativos y costos sociales o sicológicos. Los resultados sugieren que parte importante del bajo uso de los beneficios parece surgir de decisiones racionales de agentes bien informados. No obstante, las variables que buscan medir la información disponible para el afiliado muestran una correlación positiva y significativa con el comportamiento de uso del programa. Los resultados relacionados con variables asociadas a costos de transacción arrojan resultados contradictorios, por lo que es posible que estén capturando el efecto sobre aspectos no observados de las comunas de residencia (como el acceso a oportunidades laborales). 1 Este.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Fajnzylber & Isabel Poblete, 2012. "Análisis del uso de beneficios en el Seguro de Cesantía Chileno," Working Papers wp_017, Adolfo Ibáñez University, School of Government.
    • Handle: RePEc:uai:wpaper:wp_017
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    Cited by:

    1. Paula Nagler, 2013. "How unemployment insurance savings accounts affect employment duration: evidence from Chile," IZA Journal of Labor & Development, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 2(1), pages 1-25, December.
    2. Nagler P., 2013. "How unemployment insurance savings accounts affect employment duration : evidence from Chile," MERIT Working Papers 2013-039, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).

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