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Doing it now, later, or never

Author

Listed:
  • Cingiz, K.

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics)

  • Flesch, J.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Herings, P.J.J.

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics)

  • Predtetchinski, A.

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics)

Abstract
We study centipede games played by an infinite sequence of players. Following the literature on time-inconsistent preferences, we distinguish two types of decision makers, naive and sophisticated, and the corresponding solution concepts, naïve ϵ-equilibrium and sophisticated ϵ-equilibrium. We show the existence of both naive and sophisticated ϵ-equilibria for each positive ϵ. Under the assumption that the payoff functions are upper semicontinuous, we furthermore show that there exist both naive and sophisticated 0-equilibria in pure strategies. We also compare the probability to stop of a naive versus a sophisticated decision maker and show that a sophisticated decision maker stops earlier.

Suggested Citation

  • Cingiz, K. & Flesch, J. & Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A., 2015. "Doing it now, later, or never," Research Memorandum 022, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015022
    DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2015022
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Andrey Meshalkin & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2020. "Optimality, Equilibrium, and Curb Sets in Decision Problems Without Commitment," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 478-492, June.
    2. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2020. "A note on discontinuity and approximate equilibria in games with infinitely many players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    3. János Flesch & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2017. "A Characterization of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Plays in Borel Games of Perfect Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 42(4), pages 1162-1179, November.
    4. Kutay Cingiz & János Flesch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2020. "Perfect information games where each player acts only once," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(4), pages 965-985, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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