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The Productivity Effect of Public-Private Partnership

Author

Listed:
  • Mollisi Vincenzo

    (Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics, University of Torino, Torino, Italy;)

Abstract
Public authorities have increasingly resorted to public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements for the delivery of public services. A PPP bundles the construction, management, and maintenance of a facility in a unique contract. Using data from the Italian district heating industry, I find that PPP internalizes the technological externality between construction and operation tasks of a project by inducing a higher level of capital quality. A unit increase in the capital quality raises the output of PPP firms by 17%.

Suggested Citation

  • Mollisi Vincenzo, 2024. "The Productivity Effect of Public-Private Partnership," Working papers 088, Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino.
  • Handle: RePEc:tur:wpapnw:088
    as

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    File URL: https://www.bemservizi.unito.it/repec/tur/wpapnw/m88.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2024
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 145-166.
    2. De loecker, Jan & Collard-Wexler, Allan, 2016. "Production Function Estimation with Measurement Error in Inputs," CEPR Discussion Papers 11399, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 258-268, April.
    4. Haijime Katayama & Shihua Lu & James Tybout, 2003. "Why Plant-Level Productivity Studies are Often Misleading, and an Alternative Approach to Interference," NBER Working Papers 9617, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Populism; Industry Productivity; Public-private Partnerships; Public-service Provision;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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