Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective
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- Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 16543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Cited by:
- Smolin, Alex & Ichihashi, Shota, 2022.
"Data Collection by an Informed Seller,"
TSE Working Papers
22-1330, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Ichihashi, Shota & Smolin, Alex, 2022. "Data Collection by an Informed Seller," CEPR Discussion Papers 17239, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Shota Ichihashi & Alex Smolin, 2022.
"Data Provision to an Informed Seller,"
Papers
2204.08723, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
- Ichihashi, Shota & Smolin, Alex, 2023. "Data Provision to an Informed Seller," CEPR Discussion Papers 17963, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2021-09-20 (Economic Design)
- NEP-ISF-2021-09-20 (Islamic Finance)
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