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Endogenous Competence and a Limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Author

Listed:
  • Bryan McCannon

    (West Virginia University, Department of Economics)

  • Paul Walker

    (West Virginia University, Department of Economics)

Abstract
The seminal contribution, known as the Condorcet Jury Theorem, observes that under a specific set of conditions an increase in the size of a group tasked with making a decision leads to an improvement in the group's ability to make a good decision. An assumption under-appreciated is that the competency of the members of the group is assumed to be exogenous. In numerous applications, members of the group make investments to improve the accuracy of their decision making (e.g. pre-meeting efforts). We consider the collective action problem that arises. We show that if competence is endogenous, then increases in the size of the group encourages free riding. This trades off with the value of information aggregation. Thus, the value of increased group size is muted. Extensions illustrate that if committee members are allowed to exit/not participate, then the equilibrium committee size is reduced. Additionally, (non-decisive supermajority voting rules encourage the investments and, consequently, individual competence.

Suggested Citation

  • Bryan McCannon & Paul Walker, 2016. "Endogenous Competence and a Limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Working Papers 16-12, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    • Handle: RePEc:wvu:wpaper:16-12
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    File URL: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1193&context=econ_working-papers
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Guha Brishti, 2020. "Pretrial Beliefs and Verdict Accuracy: Costly Juror Effort and Free Riding," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-9, June.
    2. Aimone, Jason A. & North, Charles & Rentschler, Lucas, 2019. "Priming the jury by asking for Donations: An empirical and experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 158-167.
    3. Bryan C. McCannon & Paul Walker, 2020. "Individual Competence and Committee Decision Making: Experimental Evidence," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(4), pages 1531-1558, April.
    4. Bryan C. McCannon, 2018. "Arbitration in classical Athens," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 413-423, December.
    5. Guha, Brishti, 2018. "Secret ballots and costly information gathering: The jury size problem revisited," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 58-67.
    6. Darren Grant, 2017. "The ballot order effect is huge: evidence from Texas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 421-442, September.
    7. Bryan C. McCannon & Joylynn Pruitt, 2018. "Taking on the boss: Informative contests in prosecutor elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 657-671, October.
    8. Guha, Brishti, 2017. "Should Jurors Deliberate?," MPRA Paper 79876, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Takuya Sekiguchi, 2023. "Voting Records as Assessors of Premises Behind Collective Decisions," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 257-275, April.
    10. Gregory DeAngelo & Bryan C. McCannon, 2022. "Behavioral economics and public choice: introduction to a special issue," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 285-292, June.
    11. Alexander Lundberg, 2020. "The importance of expertise in group decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 495-521, October.
    12. Guha Brishti, 2020. "Should Jurors Deliberate?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-27, July.
    13. Guha, Brishti, 2022. "Ambiguity aversion, group size, and deliberation: Costly information and decision accuracy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 201(C), pages 115-133.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    committee decision making; Condorcet Jury Theorem; endogenous competence; group size; majority voting; supermajority voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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