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Indian Federalism, Economic Reform and Globalization

Author

Listed:
  • Nirvikar Singh

    (University of California, Santa Cruz)

  • T.N. Srinivasan

    (Yale University)

Abstract
In this paper we examine several dimensions of economic reform in India, in the context of the country’s federal system and of globalization, i.e., we explicitly recognize that the national government has subnational governments below it, and that all these layers of government simultaneously interact with foreign governments and corporations in a global economy. We examine two groups of reforms, the first involving redrawing of state-market boundaries, and the second concerned with reconfiguring federal institutions themselves. The first group includes financial sector reforms, assignment of regulatory powers, infrastructure reform and development, and privatization. We note the progress made in financial sector reform but also the problems caused for the financial sector as a whole by state and central fiscal deficits. We discuss the extreme problems of the power sector, and the important federal dimensions that make reform more difficult there. We also highlight the regional concentration of FDI in India’s more liberalized economy. The second group of reforms includes tax reforms, reform of center-state fiscal transfer mechanisms, and local government reforms. To some degree, these reforms in federal governance hold the key to opening the door to further reform elsewhere, by reducing the fiscal burden placed on the private sector by government deficits. We acknowledge the political economy aspects of reform of governance, and discuss possibilities for politically acceptable packages of fiscal reforms, such as combinations of changes in tax assignment that would be acceptable to the center as well as the state governments. We also discuss the possibility that growing regional inequalities might require the intergovernmental transfer system to be more efficient and effective in its objectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Nirvikar Singh & T.N. Srinivasan, 2004. "Indian Federalism, Economic Reform and Globalization," Public Economics 0412007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0412007
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 55
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/0412/0412007.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    2. Singh, Nirvikar & Vasishtha, Garima, 2004. "Some Patterns in Center-State Fiscal Transfers in India: An Illustrative Analysis," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt2722k3w2, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    3. Paul Cashin & Ratna Sahay, 1996. "Internal Migration, Center-State Grants, and Economic Growth in the States of India," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 43(1), pages 123-171, March.
    4. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773, September.
    5. Paul Cashin & Ratna Sahay, 1997. "Internal Migration, Center-State Grants, and Economic Growth in the States of India: A Reply to Rao and Sen," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 44(2), pages 289-291, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Information Technology and India’s Economic Development," Development and Comp Systems 0412007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. M. Govinda Rao & Nirvikar Singh, 2007. "The Political Economy of India's Fiscal Federal System and its Reform," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 37(1), pages 26-44, Winter.
    3. Peter Nunnenkamp & Rudi Stracke, 2008. "Foreign Direct Investment In Post-Reform India: Likely To Work Wonders For Regional Development?," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 33(2), pages 55-84, December.
    4. Singh, Nirvikar, 2010. "The Dynamics and Status of India’s Economic Reforms," MPRA Paper 24479, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Singh, Nirvikar, 2006. "Services-led industrialization in India: Assessment and lessons," MPRA Paper 1276, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Singh, Nirvikar, 2008. "India’s Development Strategy: Accidents, Design and Replicability," MPRA Paper 12453, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Suparna Chakraborty, 2008. "Indian Economic Growth: Lessons for the Emerging Economies," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2008-67, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    8. Raman, Rakesh & Kumari, Reena, 2012. "Regional Disparity In Agricultural Development: A District-Level Analysis For Uttar Pradesh," Journal of Regional Development and Planning, Rajarshi Majumder, vol. 1(2), pages 71-90.
    9. Kendall, Jake, 2012. "Local financial development and growth," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1548-1562.
    10. Verma, Rubina, 2012. "Can total factor productivity explain value added growth in services?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 163-177.
    11. James Laurenceson & Abby Kamalankanthan, "undated". "How important is foreign capital to income growth in China and India?," EAERG Discussion Paper Series 0405, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    12. Roy Bahl & Geeta Sethi & Sally Wallace, 2009. "West Bengal: Fiscal Decentralization to Rural Governments: Analysis and Reform Options," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0907, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H - Public Economics

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