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A Computer Scientist Looks at Game Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph Y. Halpern

    (Cornell University)

Abstract
I consider issues in distributed computation that should be of relevance to game theory. In particular, I focus on (a) representing knowledge and uncertainty, (b) dealing with failures, and (c) specification of mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Y. Halpern, 2004. "A Computer Scientist Looks at Game Theory," Game Theory and Information 0411002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0411002
    Note: Type of Document - ps; pages: 21. In Games and Economic Behavior 45:1, 2003, pp. 114-132
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    2. Linial, Nathan, 1994. "Game-theoretic aspects of computing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 38, pages 1339-1395, Elsevier.
    3. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
    4. Eliaz, K., 1999. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," Papers 21-99, Tel Aviv.
    5. Ronald Fagin & Joseph Y. Halpern & Yoram Moses & Moshe Y. Vardi, 2003. "Reasoning About Knowledge," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262562006, April.
    6. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July.
    7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-391, June.
    8. Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 1999. "Distributed Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 55-72, July.
    9. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
    10. Halpern, Joseph Y., 1997. "On Ambiguities in the Interpretation of Game Trees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 66-96, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    2. Borgonovo, E. & Cappelli, V. & Maccheroni, F. & Marinacci, M., 2018. "Risk analysis and decision theory: A bridge," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 264(1), pages 280-293.
    3. Martin Shubik, 2011. "The Present and Future of Game Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1808, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer, 2014. "Fault tolerance in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 438-457.
    5. Martin Shubik, 2012. "What is a Solution to a Matrix Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000541, David K. Levine.
    6. Joseph Y. Halpern, 2007. "Computer Science and Game Theory: A Brief Survey," Papers cs/0703148, arXiv.org.
    7. Deb, Joyee & Kalai, Ehud, 2015. "Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1041-1055.
    8. Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer, 2010. "Partial exposure in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 602-613, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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