[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wdi/papers/1997-39.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Privatization and Managerial Efficiency

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Debande
  • Guido Friebel
Abstract
We investigate the privatization decision of a government whose objectives are to preserve jobs and to stabilize its budget. The firm considered needs restructuring, i.e. some funds must be provided and the manager must undertake an effort to reorganize the firm. If the productivity of the manager is unknown to the government, privatization involves a trade-off between better managerial incentives and a loss of control: productive managers restructure since they receive the profits of the firm, but unproductive managers shirk and deviate the funds to unproductive uses. This gives rise to a soft budget constraint, and the preservation of employment may become more expensive to the government than in state ownership.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Debande & Guido Friebel, 1997. "Privatization and Managerial Efficiency," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 39, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    • Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:1997-39
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39429/3/wp39.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bennedsen, Morten, 1999. "Political Ownership," Working Papers 11-1999, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    2. Thorsten Janus, 2009. "Aid and the Soft Budget Constraint," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 264-275, May.
    3. Berglof, Erik & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Soft Budget Constraints and Banking in Transition Economies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 18-40, March.
    4. Walsh, Patrick Paul & Whelan, Ciara, 2001. "Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance: survey evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 85-112, June.
    5. Bennedsen, Morten, 2000. "Political ownership," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 559-581, June.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:1997-39. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: WDI (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/wdumius.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.