A Matter of Interpretation: Bargaining over Ambiguous Contracts
Author
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Grant, Simon & Kline, Jeff & Quiggin, John, 2009. "A Matter of Interpretation: Bargaining over Ambiguous Contracts," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151190, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999.
"Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 115-138.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1998. "Foundations of incomplete contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19354, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," NBER Working Papers 6726, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1846, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Sujoy Mukerji & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2001.
"Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Financial Markets,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(4), pages 883-904.
- Mukerji, S. & Tallon, J.-M., 1999. "Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Financial Markets," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 1999-28, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Sujoy Mukerji & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2001. "Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Financial Markets," Post-Print halshs-00174539, HAL.
- Sujoy Mukerji & Jean-Marc Tallon & Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2000. "Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Financial Markets," Economics Series Working Papers 46, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Sujoy Mukerji & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2001. "Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Financial Markets," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00174539, HAL.
- Oliver Board, 2008. "Object-Based Unawareness: Theory and Applications," Working Paper 378, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Mar 2009.
- Kathryn E. Spier, 1992. "Incomplete Contracts and Signalling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 432-443, Autumn.
- Kim-Sau Chung & Oliver Board, 2007. "Object-Based Unawareness," Working Papers 2007-2, University of Minnesota, Department of Economics, revised 24 Aug 2007.
- Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2006.
"Interactive unawareness,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 78-94, September.
- HEIFETZ, Aviad & MEIER, Martin & SCHIPPER, Burkhard C., 2004. "Interactive unawareness," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2004059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2005. "Interactive Unawareness," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 52, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1998.
"Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 902-932, September.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1997. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1787, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114.
- Chew Soo Hong & Jacob S. Sagi, 2006. "Event Exchangeability: Probabilistic Sophistication Without Continuity or Monotonicity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 771-786, May.
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989.
"Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Maxmin Expected Utility with a Non-Unique Prior," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275405, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1989. "Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior," Post-Print hal-00753237, HAL.
- Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi, 1995. "A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1241-1249, September.
- Mukerji, Sujoy, 1998. "Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Contractual Form," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1207-1231, December.
- Ilya Segal, 1999. "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 57-82.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Halpern, Joseph Y. & Kets, Willemien, 2015. "Ambiguous language and common priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 171-180.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Grant, Simon & Kline, J. Jude & Quiggin, John, 2012.
"Differential awareness, ambiguity, and incomplete contracts: A model of contractual disputes,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 494-504.
- Grant, Simon & Kline, Jeff & Quiggin, John, 2012. "Differential awareness, ambiguity, and incomplete contracts: a model of contractual disputes?," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151200, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
- Marie-Louise Vierø, 2012.
"Contracting in Vague Environments,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 104-130, May.
- Marie-Louise Viero, 2006. "Contracting In Vague Environments," Working Paper 1106, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Lucy White & Mark Williams, 2009. "Bargaining with imperfect enforcement," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 317-339, June.
- DessÃ, Roberta, 2009.
"Contractual Execution, Strategic Incompleteness and Venture Capital,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7413, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dessi, Roberta, 2009. "Contractual Execution, Strategic Incompleteness and Venture Capital," TSE Working Papers 09-075, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Dessi, Roberta, 2009. "Contractual Execution, Strategic Incompleteness and Venture Capital," IDEI Working Papers 465, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Toru Suzuki, 2020. "Efficiently Imprecise Contracts," Working Paper Series 2020/07, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
- Mehrdad Vahabi, 1999.
"From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions,"
Post-Print
halshs-03704424, HAL.
- Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2008. "From Walrasian general equilibrium to incomplete contracts : making sense of institutions," MPRA Paper 37887, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2002.
- Mehrdad Vahabi, 1999. "From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques j99008, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Lewis A. Kornhauser & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2012.
"Contracts between Legal Persons [The Handbook of Organizational Economics],"
Introductory Chapters,,
Princeton University Press.
- Kornhauser, Lewis A. & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2010. "Contracts between Legal Persons," IZA Discussion Papers 5352, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Lewis A. Kornhauser & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2010. "Contracts between Legal Persons," NBER Working Papers 16049, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grant, Simon & Kline, J. Jude & Quiggin, John, 2014.
"A matter of interpretation: Ambiguous contracts and liquidated damages,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 180-187.
- Grant, Simon & Kline, Jeff & Quiggin, John, 2011. "A Matter of Interpretation: Ambiguous Contracts and Liquidated Damages," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151198, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
- Grant, Simon & Kline, Jeff & Quiggin, John, 2012. "A Matter of Interpretation: Ambiguous Contracts and Liquidated Damages," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151204, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004.
"Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In,"
Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
109, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 2004. "Agreeing now to agree later: contracts that rule out but do not rule in," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19316, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2032, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," NBER Working Papers 10397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "AGREEING NOW TO AGREE LATER: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 472, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Makoto Hanazono, 2004.
"Holdup with Subsidized Investment,"
KIER Working Papers
586, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Makoto Hanazono, 2004. "Holdup with Subsidized Investment," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 640, Econometric Society.
- Burkhard Schipper, 2010.
"Revealed Unawareness,"
Working Papers
303, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Schipper, Burkhard C, 2010. "Revealed Unawareness," MPRA Paper 21491, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Simon Grant & Jeff Kline & John Quiggin, 2006.
"Lost in Translation: Honest Misunderstandings and Ex Post Disputes,"
Risk & Uncertainty Working Papers
WP3R06, Risk and Sustainable Management Group, University of Queensland.
- Grant, Simon & Kline, Jeff & Quiggin, John, 2006. "Lost in Translation: Honest Misunderstandings and Ex Post Disputes," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151177, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
- Salvatore Piccolo & David Martimort, 2006. "The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment," CSEF Working Papers 160, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 08 Dec 2006.
- Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011.
"Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 186-199, September.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2009. "Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Burkhard Schipper, 2013.
"Awareness-dependent subjective expected utility,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 725-753, August.
- Burkhard Schipper, 2011. "Awareness-Dependent Subjective Expected Utility," Working Papers 264, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1999.
"Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1876, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization," CEPR Discussion Papers 2280, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1999. "Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization," Papers 25-99, Tel Aviv.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization," NBER Working Papers 7303, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barney Hartman‐Glaser & Benjamin Hébert, 2020.
"The Insurance Is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(1), pages 463-506, February.
- Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Hebert, Benjamin, 2017. "The Insurance Is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," Research Papers repec:ecl:stabus:3569, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Hebert, Benjamin, 2019. "The Insurance is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," Research Papers 3569, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Barney Hartman-Glaser & Benjamin M. Hébert, 2019. "The Insurance is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," NBER Working Papers 25450, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barney Hartman-Glaser & Benjamin Hebert, 2018. "The Insurance is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," 2018 Meeting Papers 160, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Zhao, Xiaojian, 2011.
"Framing contingencies in contracts,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 31-40, January.
- Xiaojian ZHAO, 2008. "Framing Contingencies in Contracts," EcoMod2008 23800158, EcoMod.
- Wenjun Ma & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2017.
"Does exposure to unawareness affect risk preferences? A preliminary result,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 83(2), pages 245-257, August.
- Burkhard Schipper & Wenjun Ma, 2016. "Does Exposure to Unawareness Affect Risk Preferences? A Preliminary Result," Working Papers 162, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Burkhard Schipper & Wenjun Ma, 2017. "Does Exposure to Unawareness Affect Risk Preferences? A Preliminary Result," Working Papers 171, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2009.
"Contracting with Third Parties,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 75-100, February.
- Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2005. "Contracting with Third Parties," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000408, UCLA Department of Economics.
More about this item
Keywords
ambiguity; bounded rationality; expected uncertain utility; incomplete contracts; liquidated damages.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2010-04-17 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CBE-2010-04-17 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2010-04-17 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rsm:riskun:r09_3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: David Adamson (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/rsmuqau.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.