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Bargaining power and efficiency in insurance contracts

Author

Listed:
  • John Quiggin

    (Risk & Sustainable Management Group, School of Economics, University of Queensland)

  • Robert G. Chambers

    (Dept of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland, College Park)

Abstract
Insurance contracts are frequently modelled as principal--agent relationships. Although it is commonly assumed that the principal, in this case the insurer, has complete freedom to design the contract, the problem formulation in much of the principal--agent literature presumes that the contract is constrained-Pareto-efficient. In the present paper, we consider the implications of a richer specification of the choices available to clients. In particular, we consider the entire spectrum of possible power differentials in the contracting relationship between insurers and clients. Our central result is that the agent can exploit information asymmetries to offset the bargaining power of the insurer, but that this process is socially costly.

Suggested Citation

  • John Quiggin & Robert G. Chambers, 2007. "Bargaining power and efficiency in insurance contracts," Risk & Uncertainty Working Papers WP5R07, Risk and Sustainable Management Group, University of Queensland.
    • Handle: RePEc:rsm:riskun:r07_5
    as

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    File URL: http://www.uq.edu.au/rsmg/WP/WPR07_5.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    2. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    3. John K. Horowitz & Erik Lichtenberg, 1993. "Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Chemical Use in Agriculture," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 75(4), pages 926-935.
    4. Viaene, Stijn & Veugelers, Reinhilde & Dedene, Guido, 2002. "Insurance bargaining under risk aversion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 245-259, March.
    5. Quiggin, John & Chambers, Robert G., 1998. "A state-contingent production approach to principal-agent problems with an application to point-source pollution control," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 441-472, December.
    6. Quiggin, John, 2002. "Risk and Self-Protection: A State-Contingent View," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 133-145, September.
    7. Chambers,Robert G. & Quiggin,John, 2000. "Uncertainty, Production, Choice, and Agency," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521622448, September.
    8. Clive Bell, 1989. "The Choice of Tenancy Contract," International Economic Association Series, in: Irma Adelman & Sylvia Lane (ed.), The Balance between Industry and Agriculture in Economic Development, chapter 9, pages 161-178, Palgrave Macmillan.
    9. Lewis, Tracy & Nickerson, David, 1989. "Self-insurance against natural disasters," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 209-223, May.
    10. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-648, July-Aug..
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Boonen, Tim J., 2016. "Nash equilibria of Over-The-Counter bargaining for insurance risk redistributions: The role of a regulator," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 250(3), pages 955-965.
    2. Boonen, Tim J. & De Waegenaere, Anja & Norde, Henk, 2017. "Redistribution of longevity risk: The effect of heterogeneous mortality beliefs," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 175-188.
    3. Huang, Rachel J. & Huang, Yi-Chieh & Tzeng, Larry Y., 2013. "Insurance bargaining under ambiguity," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 812-820.
    4. Hu, Duni & Chen, Shou & Wang, Hailong, 2018. "Robust reinsurance contracts with uncertainty about jump risk," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 266(3), pages 1175-1188.
    5. Yanbin Chen & Pu Chen & Yumei Guo & Sanxi Li & Dongmin Yao, 2019. "Bargaining to Design Contracts under Moral Hazard," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 175(4), pages 714-735.
    6. J François Outreville, 2010. "The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 2009: In Quest of Behavioural Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 35(3), pages 484-497, July.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies

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