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Tópicos de Economía de la Regulación de los Servicios Públicos

Author

Listed:
  • Chisari, Omar

    (Universidad Argntina de la Empresa)

  • Ferro, Gustavo

    (Universidad Argntina de la Empresa)

Abstract
Competitive markets could yield socially optimum results, but although market fail in many cases. If the regulation is successful in generating competition or in replicating its incentives, the next problem to solve is to face the inherent tendency of the competition dynamic toward concentration, cartelization or monopolization of the markets. Mechanisms to ensure or to preserve competition gain importance. Regulation could be conceived as an evolutionary process starting in natural monopoly regulation and ending in competition policy. In many cases, competition is infeasible with the current state of the technology (such as in water and sanitation), whether in other infrastructure sectors it can be possible (such as in segments of telephony or power generation. Regulation is compatible with state provision, and there can be separated the provision, control and supervision of the providers, even when the former are in public hands. Normally tariffs are regulated in infrastructure sectors, also quality and safety standards. Regulation nevertheless is a second best device, since it is costly. We develop a list of topics on market failures, natural monopoly, information problems, different kind of regulatory mechanisms, access prices, the basic Ramsey model of prices, applied to regulation, universal service obligation, the quality of product and service regulation, cost of capital in regulated industries, efficiency and benchmarking, and we conclude discussing the link between infrastructure and growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Chisari, Omar & Ferro, Gustavo, 2011. "Tópicos de Economía de la Regulación de los Servicios Públicos," UADE Textos de Discusión 65_2011, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:uadetd:2011_065
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    Cited by:

    1. Gisella ARAGÓN & José Luis BONIFAZ, 2013. "The water and sanitation service provision in Peru," CIRIEC Working Papers 1306, CIRIEC - Université de Liège.
    2. Gustavo Ferro & Andrea Castellano & Chaz Sardi, 2020. "Políticas Regulatorias Aplicadas a Sectores de Infraestructura en Argentina," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 714, Universidad del CEMA.
    3. Gustavo Ferro & Omar O. Chisari, 2010. "Tópicos de Economía de la Regulación de los Servicios Públicos," Working Papers hal-00473038, HAL.
    4. Gisella ARAGÓN & José Luis BONIFAZ, 2013. "The water and sanitation service provision in Peru," CIRIEC Working Papers 1306, CIRIEC - Université de Liège.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    regulation; Competitive markets; natural monopoly; Regulación de los Servicios Públicos;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations

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