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Coordination, Timing and Common Knowledge

Author

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  • Stephen Morris

    (Princeton University)

Abstract
There is tight link between coordination and common knowledge. The role of higher order beliefs in static incomplete information games has been widely studied. In particular, information frictions break down common knowledge. A large body of literature in economics examine dynamic coordination problems when there are timing frictions, in the sense that players do not all move at once. Timing frictions in dynamic coordination games play a role that is closely analogous to information frictions in static coordination games. This paper makes explicit the role of higher order beliefs about timing in dynamic coordination games with timing frictions. An event is said to be effectively known if a player knew the event when he last had an option to change his behavior. The lack of effective common knowledge of the time drives results of dynamic coordination games.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Morris, 2013. "Coordination, Timing and Common Knowledge," Working Papers 061-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    • Handle: RePEc:pri:metric:061-2014
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    Cited by:

    1. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2016. "Common belief foundations of global games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 826-848.
    2. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Yoram Moses, 2023. "Common Knowledge, Regained," Papers 2311.04374, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
    3. Shadmehr, Mehdi & Bernhardt, Dan, 2019. "Vanguards in revolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 146-166.
    4. Guimaraes, Bernardo & Pereira, Ana Elisa, 2017. "Dynamic coordination among heterogeneous agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 13-33.
    5. Bernardo Guimaraes & Caio Machado & Ana E. Pereira, 2020. "Dynamic coordination with timing frictions: Theory and applications," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 656-697, June.
    6. Iijima, Ryota, 2015. "Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 120-136.
    7. Hubert Janos Kiss & Ismael Rodríguez-Lara & Alfonso Rosa-García, 2017. "Overthrowing the dictator: a game-theoretic approach to revolutions and media," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 329-355, August.
    8. Guimaraes, Bernardo & Pereira, Ana Elisa, 2016. "QWERTY is efficient," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 819-825.
    9. Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and game theory. A 70th anniversary," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-7.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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