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Экономическая Точка Бифуркации Для Украинского Олигархического Государства В Контексте Модели Стационарного Бандита
[Economic Point Of Bifurcation For Ukrainian Oligarchic State In The Stationary Bandit Model]

Author

Listed:
  • Konchyn, Vadym
  • Horban, Yuliia
Abstract
The article is devoted to a retrospective analysis of transitional model of Ukrainian state’s economic behavior in the context of public goods’ distribution based on the Lala-Mint classification. The characteristics and nature of the rent of fractional oligarchic state as a stationary bandit in Ukraine are defined on the basis of the McGuire-Olson model. Using basic mathematical and graphical tools and also the results of built multiple regression models the potential effects of reducing or maintaining economic rent of the stationary bandit in Ukraine are reflected. The problem of economic bifurcation point was outlined for Ukrainian oligarchic state.

Suggested Citation

  • Konchyn, Vadym & Horban, Yuliia, 2016. "Экономическая Точка Бифуркации Для Украинского Олигархического Государства В Контексте Модели Стационарного Бандита [Economic Point Of Bifurcation For Ukrainian Oligarchic State In The Stationary B," MPRA Paper 70953, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:70953
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70953/1/MPRA_paper_70953.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Deepak Lal, 1995. "Why Growth Rates Differ: The Political Economy of Social Capability in 21 Developing Countries," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Bon Ho Koo & Dwight H. Perkins (ed.), Social Capability and Long-Term Economic Growth, chapter 14, pages 288-309, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. Jensen, Nathan M., 2003. "Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 587-616, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    model of stationary bandit; economic point of bifurcation; fractional oligarchic state; facade democracy; distribution of public goods; economic interest of the state in the form of rent; behavioral models of the state; liberalization; European economic integration; people's capitalism.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C32 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes; State Space Models
    • E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • P27 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Performance and Prospects

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