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Individual and Collective Information Acquisition: An Experimental Study

Author

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  • Pëllumb Reshidi
  • Alessandro Lizzeri
  • Leeat Yariv
  • Jimmy H. Chan
  • Wing Suen
Abstract
Many committees—juries, political task forces, etc.—spend time gathering costly information before reaching a decision. We report results from lab experiments focused on such information-collection processes. We consider decisions governed by individuals and groups and compare how voting rules affect outcomes. We also contrast static information collection, as in classical hypothesis testing, with dynamic collection, as in sequential hypothesis testing. Several insights emerge. Static information collection is excessive, and sequential information collection is non-stationary, producing declining decision accuracies over time. Furthermore, groups using majority rule yield especially hasty and inaccurate decisions. Nonetheless, sequential information collection is welfare enhancing relative to static collection, particularly when unanimous rules are used.

Suggested Citation

  • Pëllumb Reshidi & Alessandro Lizzeri & Leeat Yariv & Jimmy H. Chan & Wing Suen, 2021. "Individual and Collective Information Acquisition: An Experimental Study," NBER Working Papers 29557, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29557
    Note: IO LE PE POL
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    Cited by:

    1. Evan M. Calford & Anujit Charkraborty, 2022. "The Value of and Demand for Diverse News Sources," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2022-688, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    2. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Moumita Deb & Johannes Lohse & Rebecca McDonald, 2024. "The swing voter's curse revisited: Transparency's impact on committee voting," Discussion Papers 24-01, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    3. Nicolás Figueroa & José-Alberto Guerra & Francisco Silva, 2022. "The role of information in collective decisions," Documentos CEDE 20508, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    4. Marcello Puca & Krista Jabs Saral & Simone M. Sepe, 2023. "The Value of Consensus. An Experimental Analysis of Costly Deliberation," CSEF Working Papers 680, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    5. Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Deb, Moumita & Lohse, Johannes & McDonald, Rebecca, 2024. "The Swing Voter’s Curse Revisited: Transparency’s Impact on Committee Voting," Working Papers 0744, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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