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From Revolving Doors to Regulatory Capture? Evidence from Patent Examiners

Author

Listed:
  • Haris Tabakovic
  • Thomas G. Wollmann
Abstract
Many regulatory agency employees are hired by the firms they regulate, creating a "revolving door" between the public and private sectors. We study these transitions using detailed data from the US Patent and Trademark Office. We find that patent examiners grant significantly more patents to the firms that later hire them and that leniency extends to prospective employers. Effects are strongest in years when firms are actively hiring examiners (e.g., all else equal, our estimates are attenuated during recessions). Conditional on being granted, affected patents have broader scope, as measured by claims, and lower quality, as measured by forward citations.

Suggested Citation

  • Haris Tabakovic & Thomas G. Wollmann, 2018. "From Revolving Doors to Regulatory Capture? Evidence from Patent Examiners," NBER Working Papers 24638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24638
    Note: IO LE PR
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Philippe, 2020. "Monetary and implicit incentives of patent examiners," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    2. Desai, Pranav, 2021. "Essays in corporate finance and innovation," Other publications TiSEM 1ef5fdc6-9c52-43df-be1a-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Alessandro De Chiara & Marco A. Schwarz, 2020. "A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture," Working Papers 2020-12, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    4. Kong, Nancy & Dulleck, Uwe & Jaffe, Adam B. & Sun, Shupeng & Vajjala, Sowmya, 2023. "Linguistic metrics for patent disclosure: Evidence from university versus corporate patents," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(2).
    5. Gaétan De Rassenfosse & Paul H. Jensen & T'Mir Julius & Alfons Palangkaraya & Elizabeth Webster, 2023. "Is the Patent System an Even Playing Field? The Effect of Patent Attorney Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 124-142, March.
    6. deGrazia, Charles A.W. & Pairolero, Nicholas A. & Teodorescu, Mike H.M., 2021. "Examination incentives, learning, and patent office outcomes: The use of examiner’s amendments at the USPTO," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(10).
    7. Reint Gropp & Steven Ongena & Jörg Rocholl & Vahid Saadi, 2022. "The cleansing effect of banking crises," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(3), pages 1186-1213, July.
    8. Asai, Kentaro & Kawai, Kei & Nakabayashi, Jun, 2021. "Regulatory capture in public procurement: Evidence from revolving door bureaucrats in Japan," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 328-343.
    9. Elise S. Brezis, 2023. "Regulating the Revolving Door of Regulators: Legal vs. Ethical Issues," Economies, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-13, December.
    10. Corinne Langinier & Stéphanie Lluis, 2021. "Departure And Promotion Of U.S. Patent Examiners: Do Patent Characteristics Matter?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(2), pages 416-434, April.
    11. Stuart J.H. Graham & Alan C. Marco & Richard Miller, 2018. "The USPTO Patent Examination Research Dataset: A window on patent processing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 554-578, September.
    12. Rathi, Sawan & Majumdar, Adrija & Chatterjee, Chirantan, 2024. "Did the COVID-19 pandemic propel usage of AI in pharmaceutical innovation? New evidence from patenting data," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    13. Sun, Zhen & Wright, Brian D., 2022. "Citations backward and forward: Insights into the patent examiner's role," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(7).
    14. De Chiara, Alessandro & Manna, Ester, 2022. "Corruption, regulation, and investment incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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