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Leaning Against the Wind: The Role of Different Assumptions About the Costs

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  • Lars E.O. Svensson
Abstract
“Leaning against the wind” (LAW), that is, tighter monetary policy for financial-stability purposes, has costs in terms of a weaker economy with higher unemployment and lower inflation and possible benefits from a lower probability or magnitude of a (financial) crisis. A first obvious cost is a weaker economy if no crisis occurs. A second cost—less obvious, but higher—is a weaker economy if a crisis occurs. Taking the second cost into account, Svensson (2017) shows that for representative empirical benchmark estimates and reasonable assumptions the costs of LAW exceed the benefits by a substantial margin. Previous literature has disregarded the second cost, by assuming that the crisis loss level is independent of LAW. Some recent literature has effectively disregarded the second cost, making it to be of second order by assuming that the cost of a crisis (the crisis loss level less the non-crisis loss level) is independent of LAW. In these cases where the second cost is disregarded, for representative estimates a small but economically insignificant amount of LAW is optimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars E.O. Svensson, 2017. "Leaning Against the Wind: The Role of Different Assumptions About the Costs," NBER Working Papers 23745, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23745
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lars E.O. Svensson, 2016. "Inflation Targeting and "Leaning Against the Wind"," Israel Economic Review, Bank of Israel, vol. 13(1), pages 91-99.
    2. Òscar Jordà & Moritz Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, 2016. "The great mortgaging: housing finance, crises and business cycles," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 31(85), pages 107-152.
    3. Svensson, Lars E.O., 2017. "Cost-benefit analysis of leaning against the wind," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 193-213.
    4. Moritz Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, 2012. "Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870-2008," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 1029-1061, April.
    5. Andrea Ajello & Thomas Laubach & David López-Salido & Taisuke Nakata, 2019. "Financial Stability and Optimal Interest Rate Policy," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 15(1), pages 279-326, March.
    6. Andrew Filardo & Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul, 2016. "A quantitative case for leaning against the wind," BIS Working Papers 594, Bank for International Settlements.
    7. François Gourio & Anil K. Kashyap & Jae W. Sim, 2018. "The Trade offs in Leaning Against the Wind," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 66(1), pages 70-115, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rünstler, Gerhard & Bräuer, Leonie, 2020. "Monetary policy transmission over the leverage cycle: evidence for the euro area," Working Paper Series 2421, European Central Bank.
    2. Lars E.O. Svensson, 2018. "La relación entre política monetaria y política de estabilización financiera," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 21(2), pages 082-106, August.
    3. Svensson, Lars E.O., 2017. "Cost-benefit analysis of leaning against the wind," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 193-213.
    4. Kaelo Mpho Ntwaepelo, 2021. "The Effects of Macroprudential and Monetary Policy Shocks in BRICS economies," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2021-20, Department of Economics, University of Reading.
    5. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2018. "Monetary policy and macroprudential policy: Different and separate?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 51(3), pages 802-827, August.
    6. Michael D. Bordo & Pierre Siklos, 2019. "The Transformation and Performance of Emerging Market Economies Across the Great Divide of the Global Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 26342, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Maximilien Coussin & Anne-Laure Delatte, 2019. "Les cycles financiers convergent-ils en zone euro? En phase oui, en amplitude non," La Lettre du CEPII, CEPII research center, issue 403.
    8. François Gourio & Anil K. Kashyap & Jae W. Sim, 2018. "The Trade offs in Leaning Against the Wind," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 66(1), pages 70-115, March.
    9. Dridi, Ichrak & Boughrara, Adel, 2023. "Flexible inflation targeting and stock market volatility: Evidence from emerging market economies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    10. Donato Masciandaro, 2018. "Central Banks And Macroprudential Policies: Economics And Politics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1878, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    11. Daniel Ofori‐Sasu & Elikplimi Komla Agbloyor & Saint Kuttu & Joshua Yindenaba Abor, 2023. "Bank lending behaviour and systemic banking crisis in Africa: The role of regulatory framework," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 35(6), pages 1318-1345, August.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

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