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Collaborative production networks among unequal actors

Author

Listed:
  • Manuel Munoz-Herrera
  • Jacob Dijkstra
  • Andreas Flache
  • Rafael Wittek

    (Division of Social Science)

Abstract
We develop a model of strategic network formation of collaborations to analyze the consequences of an understudied but consequential form of heterogeneity: differences between actors in the form of their production functions. We also address how this interacts with resource heterogeneity, as a way to measure the impact actors have as potential partners on a collaborative project. Some actors (e.g. start-up firms) may exhibit increasing returns to their investment into collaboration projects, while others (e.g. established firms) may face decreasing returns. Our model provides insights into how actor heterogeneity can help explain well-observed collaboration patterns. We show that if there is a direct relation between increasing returns and resources, start-ups exclude mature firms and networks become segregated by types of production function, portraying dominant group architectures. On the other hand, if there is an inverse relation between increasing returns and resources, networks portray core-periphery architectures, where the mature firms form a core and start-ups with low-resources link to them. JEL Codes: D85, D03, C72

Suggested Citation

  • Manuel Munoz-Herrera & Jacob Dijkstra & Andreas Flache & Rafael Wittek, 2019. "Collaborative production networks among unequal actors," Working Papers 20190029, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Sep 2020.
    • Handle: RePEc:nad:wpaper:20190029
    as

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    File URL: https://nyuad.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyuad/academics/divisions/social-science/working-papers/2020/0029(1).pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Falk Armin & Kosfeld Michael, 2012. "It's all about Connections: Evidence on Network Formation," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-36, September.
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    7. Galeotti, Andrea & Goyal, Sanjeev & Kamphorst, Jurjen, 2006. "Network formation with heterogeneous players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 353-372, February.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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