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Job Assignment with Multivariate Skills

Author

Listed:
  • Stefanie Brilon

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

Abstract
This paper analyzes the job assignment problem faced by a firm when workers’ skills are distributed along several dimensions and jobs require different skills to varying extent. I derive optimal assignment rules with and without slot constraints, and show that under certain circumstances workers may get promoted although in their new job they are expected to be less productive than in their old job. This can be interpreted as a version of the Peter Principle which states that workers get promoted up to their level of incompetence.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefanie Brilon, 2010. "Job Assignment with Multivariate Skills," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_25, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_25
    as

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    File URL: http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2010_25online.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    6. James A. Fairburn & James M. Malcomson, 2001. "Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(1), pages 45-66.
    7. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2006. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 59-108, January.
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    11. Jaime Ortega, 2001. "Job Rotation as a Learning Mechanism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(10), pages 1361-1370, October.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    job assignment; worker selection; internal hiring; Peter Principle; slot constraints; multi-dimensional skills;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General
    • J62 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Job, Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

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