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Can Compulsory Dialogues Nudge Sick-Listed Workers Back to Work?

Author

Listed:
  • Markussen, Simen

    (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)

  • Røed, Knut

    (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)

  • Schreiner, Ragnhild Camilla

    (University of Oslo)

Abstract
We evaluate the impacts of a compulsory dialogue meeting for long-term sick-listed workers in Norway. The meeting is organised by the local social security administration after around six months of absence, and its purpose is to bring together the absentee, the employer, and the family physician to discuss whether arrangements can be made to facilitate partial or full work resumption. Our causal analysis is based on random-assignment-like geographical variation in the meeting propensity. We find that the meetings reduce absence duration considerably, both through a notification and an attendance effect. They also reduce the risk of premature labour market exit.

Suggested Citation

  • Markussen, Simen & Røed, Knut & Schreiner, Ragnhild Camilla, 2015. "Can Compulsory Dialogues Nudge Sick-Listed Workers Back to Work?," IZA Discussion Papers 9090, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9090
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    10. Brian Graversen & Brian Larsen, 2013. "Is there a threat effect of mandatory activation programmes for the long-term unemployed?," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 1031-1051, April.
    11. Per Johansson & Erica Lindahl, 2013. "Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experiment," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 1673-1695, June.
    12. Elisabeth Fevang & Simen Markussen & Knut Røed, 2014. "The Sick Pay Trap," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(2), pages 305-336.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mathilde Godard & Maarten Lindeboom & Pierre Koning, 2018. "Targeting disability insurance applications with screening," Post-Print halshs-01960488, HAL.
    2. Yonatan Ben-Shalom & Steve Bruns & Kara Contreary & David Stapleton, "undated". "Stay-at-Work/Return-to-Work: Key Facts, Critical Information Gaps, and Current Practices and Proposals," Mathematica Policy Research Reports a56bde146b0444f2a6bb67940, Mathematica Policy Research.
    3. Kara Contreary & Irma Perez-Johnson, "undated". "Behavioral Interventions to Promote Job Retention after Injury or Illness," Mathematica Policy Research Reports e58fc9613c9b4bf3bae31f848, Mathematica Policy Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    moral hazard; public social insurance; instrumental variables; treatment effects;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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