[go: up one dir, main page]

IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp13379.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

If Sick-Leave Becomes More Costly, Will I Go Back to Work? Could It Be Too Soon?

Author

Listed:
  • Marie, Olivier

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

  • Vall-Castello, Judit

    (University of Barcelona)

Abstract
We investigate the impact on work absence of a massive reduction in paid sick leave benefits. We exploit a policy change that only affected public sector workers in Spain and compare changes in the number and length of spells they take relative to unaffected private sector workers. Our results highlight a large drop in frequency mostly offset by increases in average duration. Overall, the policy did reduce number of days lost to sick leave. For some, however, return to work may have been premature as we document huge increases in both the proportion of relapses and working accidents rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie, Olivier & Vall-Castello, Judit, 2020. "If Sick-Leave Becomes More Costly, Will I Go Back to Work? Could It Be Too Soon?," IZA Discussion Papers 13379, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13379
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://docs.iza.org/dp13379.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Petri Böckerman & Ohto Kanninen & Ilpo Suoniemi, 2018. "A kink that makes you sick: The effect of sick pay on absence," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(4), pages 568-579, June.
    2. Jérôme Adda, 2016. "Economic Activity and the Spread of Viral Diseases: Evidence from High Frequency Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(2), pages 891-941.
    3. Manasi Deshpande & Yue Li, 2019. "Who Is Screened Out? Application Costs and the Targeting of Disability Programs," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 213-248, November.
    4. Bratberg, Espen & Monstad, Karin, 2015. "Worried sick? Worker responses to a financial shock," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 111-120.
    5. Ziebarth, Nicolas R. & Karlsson, Martin, 2010. "A natural experiment on sick pay cuts, sickness absence, and labor costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 1108-1122, December.
    6. Nicolas R. Ziebarth & Martin Karlsson, 2014. "The Effects Of Expanding The Generosity Of The Statutory Sickness Insurance System," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(2), pages 208-230, March.
    7. Pichler, Stefan & Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2017. "The pros and cons of sick pay schemes: Testing for contagious presenteeism and noncontagious absenteeism behavior," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 14-33.
    8. Boone, Jan & van Ours, Jan C. & Wuellrich, Jean-Philippe & Zweimüller, Josef, 2011. "Recessions are bad for workplace safety," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 764-773, July.
    9. Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa & Valeria Pupo, 2014. "Absenteeism in the Italian Public Sector: The Effects of Changes in Sick Leave Policy," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(2), pages 337-360.
    10. Petrongolo, Barbara, 2009. "The long-term effects of job search requirements: Evidence from the UK JSA reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1234-1253, December.
    11. Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2013. "Long-term absenteeism and moral hazard—Evidence from a natural experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 277-292.
    12. Lex Borghans & Anne C. Gielen & Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2014. "Social Support Substitution and the Earnings Rebound: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity in Disability Insurance Reform," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 34-70, November.
    13. Petri Böckerman & Ohto Kanninen & Ilpo Suoniemi, 2014. "A Kink that Makes You Sick: The Incentive Effect of Sick Pay on Absence," Working Papers 292, Työn ja talouden tutkimus LABORE, The Labour Institute for Economic Research LABORE.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Boeri, Tito & di Porto, Edoardo & Naticchioni, Paolo & Scrutinio, Vincenzo, 2021. "Friday Morning Fever. Evidence from a Randomized Experiment on Sick Leave Monitoring in the Public Sector," IZA Discussion Papers 14346, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Adams-Prassl, Abi & Boneva, Teodora & Golin, Marta & Rauh, Christopher, 2023. "The value of sick pay," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    3. Maclean, J. Catherine & Pichler, Stefan & Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2020. "Mandated Sick Pay: Coverage, Utilization, and Welfare Effects," IZA Discussion Papers 13132, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Abi Adams‐Prassl & Teodora Boneva & Marta Golin & Christopher Rauh, 2020. "Furloughing," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(3), pages 591-622, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Olivier Marie & Judit Vall Castelló, 2023. "Sick Leave Cuts and (Unhealthy) Returns to Work," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(4), pages 923-956.
    2. Stijn Baert & Bas van der Klaauw & Gijsbert van Lomwel, 2018. "The effectiveness of medical and vocational interventions for reducing sick leave of self‐employed workers," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 139-152, February.
    3. Pichler, Stefan & Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2017. "The pros and cons of sick pay schemes: Testing for contagious presenteeism and noncontagious absenteeism behavior," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 14-33.
    4. Maclean, J. Catherine & Pichler, Stefan & Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2020. "Mandated Sick Pay: Coverage, Utilization, and Welfare Effects," IZA Discussion Papers 13132, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Cronin, C.J.; & Harris, M. C.; & Ziebarth, N. R.;, 2024. "The Anatomy of U.S. Sick Leave Schemes:Evidence from Public School Teachers," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 24/10, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
    6. Pichler, Stefan & Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2019. "Reprint of: The pros and cons of sick pay schemes: Testing for contagious presenteeism and noncontagious absenteeism behavior," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 86-104.
    7. Bryson, Alex & Dale-Olsen, Harald, 2017. "Does Sick Pay Affect Workplace Absence?," IZA Discussion Papers 11222, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Stefan Pichler & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2020. "Labor Market Effects of U.S. Sick Pay Mandates," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 55(2), pages 611-659.
    9. Pichler, Stefan & Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2024. "Sick leave and medical leave in the United States: A categorization and recent trends," ZEW Discussion Papers 24-011, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    10. Stefan Pichler & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2015. "The Pros and Cons of Sick Pay Schemes: Testing for Contagious Presenteeism and Shirking Behavior," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1509, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    11. Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2013. "Long-term absenteeism and moral hazard—Evidence from a natural experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 277-292.
    12. Richard V. Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2016. "Protecting working-age people with disabilities: experiences of four industrialized nations [Absicherung von Personen mit Erwerbsminderung: Erfahrungen aus vier Industrieländern]," Journal for Labour Market Research, Springer;Institute for Employment Research/ Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), vol. 49(4), pages 367-386, December.
    13. Pichler, Stefan & Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2015. "The Pros and Cons of Sick Pay Schemes: A Method to Test for Contagious Presenteeism and Shirking Behavior," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112940, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. Pablo Blanchard & Gabriel Burdín & Andrés Dean, 2023. "Property Rights and Effort Supply," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 23-01, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    15. Martin Halla & Susanne Pech & Martina Zweimüller, 2017. "The effect of statutory sick-pay on workers' labor supply and subsequent health," Working Papers 2017-04, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    16. Eliason, Marcus & Johansson, Per & Nilsson, Martin, 2019. "Forward-looking moral hazard in social insurance," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 84-98.
    17. Eliason, Marcus & Johansson, Per & Nilsson, Martin, 2018. "Forward-looking moral hazard in social insurance: evidence from a natural experiment," Working Paper Series 2018:11, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    18. Johanna Catherine Maclean & Stefan Pichler & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2020. "Mandated Sick Pay: Coverage, Utilization, and Crowding-In," NBER Working Papers 26832, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Gürtzgen, Nicole & Hiesinger, Karolin, 2020. "Dismissal protection and long-term sickness absence: First evidence from Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-040, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    20. Carlo Alberto Biscardo & Alessandro Bucciol & Paolo Pertile, 2019. "Job sick leave: Detecting opportunistic behavior," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(3), pages 373-386, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    benefit displacement; relapses contagious diseases; presenteeism; absenteeism; paid sick leave; sickness insurance; working accidents; negative externalities; Spain; COVID-19;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13379. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Holger Hinte (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/izaaade.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.