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The Role of Leaders in Inducing and Maintaining Cooperation: The CC Strategy

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  • Kosfeld, Michael

    (Goethe University Frankfurt)

Abstract
I discuss recent findings from behavioral economic experiments in the lab and in the field on the role of leaders in human cooperation. Three implications for leadership are derived, which are summarized under the notion CC strategy. Firstly, leaders need to trust to not demotivate the motivated. Secondly, leaders need to punish to motivate the non-motivated. Finally, leaders shall (and can) attract motivated types. The discussion is embedded in a more general attempt to promote and stimulate interdisciplinary exchange of both methods and ideas in leadership research.

Suggested Citation

  • Kosfeld, Michael, 2019. "The Role of Leaders in Inducing and Maintaining Cooperation: The CC Strategy," IZA Discussion Papers 12540, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12540
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    2. Michael Eichenseer & Johannes Moser, 2019. "Conditional cooperation: Type stability across games," Working Papers 186, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    3. Eichenseer, Michael & Moser, Johannes, 2020. "Conditional cooperation: Type stability across games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    experiments; cooperation; leadership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics

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