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The Impact of Sleep Restriction on Interpersonal Conflict Resolution and the Narcotic Effect

Author

Listed:
  • Dickinson, David L.

    (Appalachian State University)

  • McEvoy, David M.

    (Appalachian State University)

  • Bruner, David

    (Appalachian State University)

Abstract
Insufficient sleep is commonplace, and understanding how this affects interpersonal conflict holds implications for personal and workplace settings. We experimentally manipulated participant sleep state for a full week prior to administering a stylized bargaining task that models payoff uncertainty at impasse with a final-offer arbitration (FOA) procedure. FOA use in previous trials decreases the likelihood of voluntary settlements going forward—the narcotic effect. We also report a novel result that a significantly stronger narcotic effect is estimated for more sleepy bargaining pairs. One implication is that insufficient sleep predicts increased dependency on alternatives to voluntarily resolution of interpersonal conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • Dickinson, David L. & McEvoy, David M. & Bruner, David, 2021. "The Impact of Sleep Restriction on Interpersonal Conflict Resolution and the Narcotic Effect," IZA Discussion Papers 14536, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp14536
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. David L. Dickinson, 2023. "Alternative dispute resolution," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 1-71, March.
    2. Dickinson, David L. & Masclet, David, 2023. "Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 484-502.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    dispute/conflict resolution; arbitration; sleep restriction; bargaining; narcotic effect;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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