Measuring Market Power in a Dynamic Oligopoly Model: The Dallas-Forth Worth Milk Market Case
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Cited by:
- Piedrabuena, Bernardita, 2013. "Competencia en el mercado bancario del crédito en Chile," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 4630, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Orea, Luis, 2007. "Estimating Firm-Specific Market Power: A Composed Error Term Approach," Efficiency Series Papers 2007/02, University of Oviedo, Department of Economics, Oviedo Efficiency Group (OEG).
- Mustafa U. Karakaplan & Levent Kutlu, 2019. "Estimating market power using a composed error model," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 66(4), pages 489-510, September.
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More about this item
Keywords
Dallas-Fort Worth Milk Market; Conduct Parameter; Dynamic Supergame; Market Power; Collusion;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
- Q0 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General
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