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Why Did Pre-Modern States Adopt Big-God Religions?

Author

Listed:
  • Stergios Skaperdas

    (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

  • Samarth Vaidya

    (Department of Economics, Deakin Business School, Deakin University)

Abstract
Over the past two millennia successful pre-modern states in Eurasia adopted and cultivated Big-God religions that emphasize (i) the ruler's legitimacy as divinely ordained and (ii) a morality adapted for large-scale societies that can have positive economic effects. We make sense of this development by building on previous research that has conceptualized pre-modern states as maximizing the ruler’s profit. We model the interaction of rulers and subjects who have both material and psychological payoffs, the latter emanating from religious identity. Overall, religion reduces the cost of controlling subjects through the threat of violence, increases production, increases tax revenue, and reduces banditry. A Big-God ruler, who is also a believer, has greater incentives to invest in expanding the number of believers and the intensity of belief, as well as investing in state capacity. Furthermore, such investments are often complementary, mutually reinforcing one another, thus leading to an evolutionary advantage of rulers that adopted Big-God religions.

Suggested Citation

  • Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2019. "Why Did Pre-Modern States Adopt Big-God Religions?," Working Papers 181908, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:181908
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    File URL: https://www.economics.uci.edu/research/wp/1819/18-19-08.pdf
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    1. Why Did Pre-Modern States Adopt Big-God Religions?
      by Alessandro Cerboni in Knowledge Team on 2019-07-24 09:29:01

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    State; Ruler; Anarchy; Religion; Morality; Legitimacy; State capacity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • P40 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - General
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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