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Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects: evidence from a quasi-experiment in Italy

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  • Sergio Galletta

    (Institute of Economics (IdEP), University of Lugano)

Abstract
In this paper, I empirically investigate the presence of spillover effects resulting from the strengthening of law enforcement against corruption and organized crime in local governments. Specifically, I take advantage of an Italian law that gives power to the central government to replace democratically elected municipal officials who are potentially connected with mafia with a commission of non-elected administrators. Fixed effects model estimates that focus on a sample of municipalities from three Italian regions (Campania, Calabria and Sicilia) for the period 1998 to 2013 show that the city council dismissal of a municipality fosters a reduction in public investments in neighboring municipalities. Additional empirical evidence suggests that this result could be explained by the presence of law enforcement spillovers potentially reducing misconducts in neighboring municipalities.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergio Galletta, 2016. "Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects: evidence from a quasi-experiment in Italy," Working Papers 2016/1, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    • Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2016-1
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Horizontal interaction; Italy; mafia; corruption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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