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Eliciting the Regulation of an Economic System: The Case of the French Rail Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Ivaldi, Marc
  • Pouyet, Jérôme
Abstract
Based on the modern theory of regulation, the analysis aims to characterize the effective economic regulation of the French railway industry. The methodology consists in econometrically testing various scenarios of regulation and determining which of these best fits the data. Using aggregate data on the overall passenger traffic for the incumbent French rail operator (RO), SNCF, the two behavioral hypotheses of reference which we consider –absence of regulation of the rail operator which acts as a pure monopoly, and price regulation of services supplied by the RO– are both statistically significant and do not subtract from each other. This result is certainly related to the fact that passenger services include both high speed train services, for which the RO has some entrepreneurial freedom, and regional transport services, which are regulated by local authorities. In any case however, as the presence of unobservable efforts exerted by the RO to improve its productivity is statistically relevant, one concludes that the RO is not fully and properly regulated. This emphasizes that the design of policy reforms must account for the incentives they create on the RO. The analysis also shows that the most statistically significant scenarios are the ones in which the access tariff imposed by the infrastructure manager is such that the revenue generated by the access tariff is equal to the infrastructure spending. The pricing of the access to the infrastructure network therefore does not seem to be governed by economic principles, but more by budget considerations. While data limitations does neither allow to understand all the facets of a complex reality, nor to claim a high level of precision in the measure of all the parameters of interest, we believe however that we provide an objective methodology to characterize the optimal economic policies for the railway sector, in particular because it yields realistic estimates of the main structural parameters. Indeed the empirical results suggest that the railway industry as a whole exhibits increasing returns to scale, which incidentally is not compatible with the presence of multiple firms. In addition, the elasticity of demand for railway transport is relatively high, an indication of the competitive constraints this mode of transport faces from other transport modes or induced traffic.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivaldi, Marc & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2010. "Eliciting the Regulation of an Economic System: The Case of the French Rail Industry," IDEI Working Papers 650, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:23730
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Meunier, David & Quinet, Emile, 2012. "Applications of transport economics and imperfect competition," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 19-29.
    2. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2002. "Incentive Regulatory Policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 605-629, Winter.
    3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The regulation of multiproduct firms : Part I: Theory," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-36, October.
    4. Isabelle Brocas & Kitty Chan & Isabelle Perrigne, 2006. "Regulation under Asymmetric Information in Water Utilities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 62-66, May.
    5. Frank A. Wolak, 1994. "An Econometric Analysis of the Asymmetric Information, Regulator-Utility Interaction," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 34, pages 1-12.
    6. repec:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:34:p:02 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
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    9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The regulation of multiproduct firms : Part II: Applications to competitive environments and policy analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 37-66, October.
    10. Gasmi, F & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Sharkey, W W, 1997. "Incentive Regulation and the Cost Structure of the Local Telephone Exchange Network," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 5-25, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sun, Xinyu & Yan, Sen & Liu, Tao & Wang, Jiayin, 2023. "The impact of high-speed rail on urban economy: Synergy with urban agglomeration policy," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 141-154.
    2. Gutiérrez-Hita, Carlos & de la Cruz, Omar & Ramos-Melero, Rodolfo, 2022. "Infrastructure access charges, service differentiation, and strategic competition in the EU railway passenger market," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 87-104.
    3. Patrice Bougette & Axel Gautier & Frédéric Marty, 2021. "Which access to which assets for an effective liberalization of the railway sector?," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 22(2), pages 87-110, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; Asymmetric information; Railroad industry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation

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