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The Multilateral Response to the Global Crisis: Rationale, Modalities, and Feasibility

Author

Listed:
  • Fernández-Arias, Eduardo
  • Powell, Andrew
  • Rebucci, Alessandro
Abstract
The paper reviews the case for a strong multilateral response to the global crisis in emerging markets (EMs). It discusses modalities and feasibility of intervention and its associated risks, depending on country circumstances of fiscal space and liquidity needs. The specific role of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in ensuring the development effectiveness of the fiscal response is also discussed. The paper concludes by highlighting the international financial architecture issues raised by the global crisis that cannot be addressed immediately but will need to be dealt with once the current crisis has been tamed.

Suggested Citation

  • Fernández-Arias, Eduardo & Powell, Andrew & Rebucci, Alessandro, 2009. "The Multilateral Response to the Global Crisis: Rationale, Modalities, and Feasibility," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1653, Inter-American Development Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:1653
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    9. Powell, Andrew & Arozamena, Leandro, 2003. "Liquidity protection versus moral hazard: the role of the IMF," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 1041-1063, December.
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    11. A. R. Pagan & Mr. Douglas Laxton & Mr. Luis Catão, 2008. "Monetary Transmission in an Emerging Targeter: The Case of Brazil," IMF Working Papers 2008/191, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo Fernandez-Arias, 2010. "Multilateral Safety Nets for Financial Crises," Research Department Publications 4668, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    2. Ricardo N. Bebczuk, 2010. "The Financial Impact of the IDB’s Liquidity Program for Growth Sustainability," Department of Economics, Working Papers 079, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    WP-683;

    JEL classification:

    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • F37 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Finance Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • F39 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Other
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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