[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/idb/brikps/11101.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Preferred and Non-Preferred Creditors

Author

Listed:
  • Cordella, Tito
  • Powell, Andrew
Abstract
International financial institutions (IFIs) generally enjoy preferred creditors treatment (PCT). Although PCT rarely appears in legal contracts, when sovereigns restructure bilateral or commercial debts, they normally pay IFIs in full. This paper presents a model where a creditor, such as an IFI, that can commit to lend limited amounts at the risk-free rate and can refrain from lending into arrears is always repaid and adds value. The analysis suggests that IFIs and market lenders can both enhance welfare, even if banning commercial borrowing can sometimes be optimal. To maintain their status, preferred lenders should offer low cost financing in volumes that are consistent with countries' incentives to repay even in bad states. This suggests such lenders should not differentiate lending interest rates according to risk and should not participate in the restructuring of commercial debt.

Suggested Citation

  • Cordella, Tito & Powell, Andrew, 2021. "Preferred and Non-Preferred Creditors," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 11101, Inter-American Development Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:11101
    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0003109
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Preferred-and-Non-Preferred-Creditors.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0003109?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fink, Fabian & Scholl, Almuth, 2016. "A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 176-190.
    2. Mark Wright, 2018. "The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt," 2018 Meeting Papers 928, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Gonçalves, Carlos Eduardo & Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2015. "Sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 68-82.
    4. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-178, February.
    5. Brian D. Wright & Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 621-639, June.
    6. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Erce, Aitor & Uy, Timothy, 2018. "Debt Sustainability and the Terms of Official Support," CEPR Discussion Papers 13292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2012. "Maturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2674-2699, October.
    8. Hatchondo, Juan Carlos & Martinez, Leonardo & Onder, Yasin Kursat, 2017. "Non-defaultable debt and sovereign risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 217-229.
    9. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    10. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2009. "Optimal Debt? On the Insurance Value of International Debt Flows to Developing Countries," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 489-507, September.
    11. Boz, Emine, 2011. "Sovereign default, private sector creditors, and the IFIs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 70-82, January.
    12. William Perraudin & Andrew Powell & Peng Yang, 2016. "Multilateral Development Bank Ratings and Preferred Creditor Status," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 94656, Inter-American Development Bank.
    13. Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-1097, December.
    14. Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2014. "The role of creditor seniority in Europe's sovereign debt crisis [What is the risk of European sovereign debt defaults? Fiscal space, CDS spreads and market pricing of risk]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 29(79), pages 495-552.
    15. Ronald W. Anderson & Christopher L. Gilbert & Andrew Powell, 1989. "Securitization and Commodity Contingency in International Lending," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 71(2), pages 523-530.
    16. Anderson, Ronald W. & Gilbert, Christopher L, 1989. "Securitization and Commodity Contingency in International Lending," CEPR Discussion Papers 295, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. repec:oup:ecpoli:v:29:y:2014:i:79:p:495-552 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, 2009. "Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority -super-1," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 879-902.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ugo Panizza & Andrew Powell, 2023. "Reducing Public Debt: What Works Best?," IDB Publications (Book Chapters), in: Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia (ed.), Dealing with Debt, edition 1, chapter 9, pages 197-222, Inter-American Development Bank.
    2. Krahnke, Tobias, 2020. "Doing more with less: The catalytic function of IMF lending and the role of program size," Discussion Papers 18/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    3. Eduardo Cavallo & Eduardo Fernández Arias, 2023. "Strong External Balance Sheets for Resilient Economies," IDB Publications (Book Chapters), in: Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia (ed.), Dealing with Debt, edition 1, chapter 2, pages 5-36, Inter-American Development Bank.
    4. João Ayres & Anna Gelpern & Andrew Powell, 2023. "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: In Need of a New Approach," IDB Publications (Book Chapters), in: Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia (ed.), Dealing with Debt, edition 1, chapter 10, pages 223-254, Inter-American Development Bank.
    5. Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia, 2023. "The Debt Conundrum," IDB Publications (Book Chapters), in: Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia (ed.), Dealing with Debt, edition 1, chapter 1, pages 1-4, Inter-American Development Bank.
    6. Leandro Andrián & Oscar Mauricio Valencia, 2023. "Past the Tipping Point? Assessing Debt Overhang in Latin America and the Caribbean," IDB Publications (Book Chapters), in: Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia (ed.), Dealing with Debt, edition 1, chapter 8, pages 183-196, Inter-American Development Bank.
    7. María Cecilia Acevedo & Leandro Andrián & Victoria Nuguer & Oscar Mauricio Valencia, 2023. "Understanding the Rise in Debt," IDB Publications (Book Chapters), in: Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia (ed.), Dealing with Debt, edition 1, chapter 4, pages 67-94, Inter-American Development Bank.
    8. Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia, 2023. "The Bottom Line on Debt," IDB Publications (Book Chapters), in: Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia (ed.), Dealing with Debt, edition 1, chapter 13, pages 309-318, Inter-American Development Bank.
    9. Rodrigo Heresi & Andrew Powell, 2023. "Balance Sheet Vulnerabilities in the Wake of the Pandemic," IDB Publications (Book Chapters), in: Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia (ed.), Dealing with Debt, edition 1, chapter 12, pages 285-308, Inter-American Development Bank.
    10. Avellán, Leopoldo & Galindo, Arturo J. & Gómez, Tomás & Lotti, Giulia, 2024. "The cyclicality of official bilateral lending: Which cycle do flows follow?," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    11. Eduardo Borensztein & Eduardo Cavallo, 2023. "Domestic Bond Markets: Successes and Challenges," IDB Publications (Book Chapters), in: Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia (ed.), Dealing with Debt, edition 1, chapter 3, pages 37-66, Inter-American Development Bank.
    12. María Cecilia Acevedo & Vanessa Alviarez & Joaquin Lennon Sabatini, 2023. "Managing Private Debt," IDB Publications (Book Chapters), in: Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia (ed.), Dealing with Debt, edition 1, chapter 11, pages 255-284, Inter-American Development Bank.
    13. María Bru Muñoz, 2023. "The forgotten lender: the role of multilateral lenders in sovereign debt and default," Working Papers 2301, Banco de España.
    14. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Andrew Powell, 2023. "Sovereign Debt Management," IDB Publications (Book Chapters), in: Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia (ed.), Dealing with Debt, edition 1, chapter 6, pages 123-160, Inter-American Development Bank.
    15. Powell, Andrew & Valencia, Oscar, 2023. "Dealing with Debt: Less Risk for More Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 12664, November.
    16. Leopoldo Avellán & Arturo Galindo & Giulia Lotti, 2023. "Official Creditors: Providing More than Money," IDB Publications (Book Chapters), in: Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia (ed.), Dealing with Debt, edition 1, chapter 7, pages 161-182, Inter-American Development Bank.
    17. Juan Manuel Hernández & Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia, 2023. "Debt Sustainability: More Important than Ever," IDB Publications (Book Chapters), in: Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia (ed.), Dealing with Debt, edition 1, chapter 5, pages 95-122, Inter-American Development Bank.
    18. Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Francisco Cantamutto & Laura Clérico, 2022. "IMF’s Surcharges as a Threat to the Right to Development," Development, Palgrave Macmillan;Society for International Deveopment, vol. 65(2), pages 194-202, December.
    19. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2023. "On the Preferred Creditor Status of Multilateral Development Banks," CESifo Working Paper Series 10521, CESifo.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph & Enderlein, Henrik, 2021. "Sovereign defaults in court," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    2. Nikolai Stähler, 2013. "Recent Developments In Quantitative Models Of Sovereign Default," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 605-633, September.
    3. Carré, Sylvain & Cohen, Daniel & Villemot, Sébastien, 2019. "The sources of sovereign risk: a calibration based on Lévy stochastic processes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 31-43.
    4. Mauricio Drelichman & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2015. "Risk sharing with the monarch: contingent debt and excusable defaults in the age of Philip II, 1556–1598," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 9(1), pages 49-75, January.
    5. Thomas McGregor, 2019. "Pricing Sovereign Debt in Resource-Rich Economies," IMF Working Papers 2019/240, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Yue, Vivian Z., 2010. "Sovereign default and debt renegotiation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 176-187, March.
    7. Engler, Philipp & Große Steffen, Christoph, 2016. "Sovereign risk, interbank freezes, and aggregate fluctuations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 34-61.
    8. Fabrice Collard & Michel Habib & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2015. "Sovereign Debt Sustainability In Advanced Economies," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 381-420, June.
    9. Thomas McGregor, 2017. "Pricing sovereign debt in resource rich economies," OxCarre Working Papers 194, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    10. Bernardo Guimaraes & Lucas Tumkus, 2020. "On the costs of sovereign default in quantitative models," Discussion Papers 2021, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    11. Aguiar, Mark & Amador, Manuel, 2014. "Sovereign Debt," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 647-687, Elsevier.
    12. Bordo, M.D. & Meissner, C.M., 2016. "Fiscal and Financial Crises," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 355-412, Elsevier.
    13. Kobielarz, M.L., 2023. "Bailout dynamics in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    14. Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, 2013. "Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 247-272, May.
    15. Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi, 2019. "Sovereign risk after sovereign restructuring. Private and official default," Working Papers 423, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2019.
    16. Fernando Broner & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2010. "Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1523-1555, September.
    17. Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, 2009. "The Costs of Sovereign Default," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 56(4), pages 683-741, November.
    18. Cohen, Daniel & Villemot, Sébastien, 2012. "The Sovereign Default Puzzle: Modelling Issues and Lessons for Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 8971, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & César Sosa-Padilla, 2016. "Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1383-1422.
    20. Niepelt, Dirk, 2014. "Debt maturity without commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(S), pages 37-54.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    sovereign debt; Preferred Creditor Treatment; Preferred Creditor Status; Sovereign Defaults; International Financially Institutions; Emergency Financing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • P33 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - International Trade, Finance, Investment, Relations, and Aid

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:11101. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Felipe Herrera Library (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iadbbus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.