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Compliance Spillovers across Taxes: The Role of Penalties and Detection

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  • López-Luzuriaga, Andrea
  • Scartascini, Carlos
Abstract
What happens when the tax authority increases enforcement in one tax with compliance in other taxes? The very little evidence available is not conclusive. This paper presents a very simple analytical model that shows the conditions under which spillovers could be positive or negative in the context of uncorrelated taxes for the same individual (a property tax and a self-declaration tax—in this instance, a gross-sale tax). In the model, the sign of the spillover depends on how taxpayers update their beliefs on penalty and detection probabilities for one tax after watching the deterrence actions the tax agency took on another tax. Results from a randomized field experiment show no evidence of negative spillovers: increasing the salience of fines and enforcement probabilities for those who do not comply with the payment of the property tax does not decrease how much the same individual declares on the gross-sale tax. The result has ample implications for researchers bringing interventions to the field and for governments’ enforcement strategies. Given that most taxpayers are liable for more than one tax, neither researchers nor authorities can continue to neglect potential spillovers of interventions. Instead, they should design enforcement strategies that maximize compliance across the portfolio of taxes. Importantly, this work indicates that penalties and detection may not be perfect substitutes when the portfolio is taken into consideration.

Suggested Citation

  • López-Luzuriaga, Andrea & Scartascini, Carlos, 2018. "Compliance Spillovers across Taxes: The Role of Penalties and Detection," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 9293, Inter-American Development Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:9293
    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0001414
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    2. Chan, Ho Fai & Gangl, Katharina & Supriyadi, Mohammad Wangsit & Torgler, Benno, 2023. "The effects of increased monitoring on high wealth individuals: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in Indonesia," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 215(C), pages 244-267.
    3. Bellon, Matthieu & Dabla-Norris, Era & Khalid, Salma, 2023. "Technology and tax compliance spillovers: Evidence from a VAT e-invoicing reform in Peru," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 756-777.
    4. Cai, Xiaoqiang & Chen, Jian & Xiao, Yongbo & Xu, Xiaolin & Yu, Gang, 2013. "Fresh-product supply chain management with logistics outsourcing," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 752-765.
    5. Okunogbe,Oyebola Motunrayo & Santoro,Fabrizio, 2021. "The Promise and Limitations of Information Technology for Tax Mobilization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9848, The World Bank.
    6. Li, Lixing & Liu, Kevin Zhengcheng & Nie, Zhuo & Xi, Tianyang, 2021. "Evading by any means? VAT enforcement and payroll tax evasion in China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 770-784.
    7. Yogama, Eko Arief & Gray, Daniel J. & Rablen, Matthew D., 2024. "Nudging for prompt tax penalty payment: Evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 224(C), pages 548-579.
    8. Sixia Chen & Yuan Fang & Shengfeng Lu & Haotian Zhang, 2024. "Tackle spurious invoices challenges to VAT compliance: a quasi-experiment of input VAT deduction reform in China," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(5), pages 1342-1387, October.
    9. James Alm & Laura Rosales Cifuentes & Carlos Mauricio Ortiz Niño & Diana Rocha, 2019. "Can Behavioral “Nudges” Improve Compliance? The Case of Colombia Social Protection Contributions," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-23, October.
    10. Ortega, Daniel & Scartascini, Carlos, 2020. "Don’t blame the messenger. The Delivery method of a message matters," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 286-300.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    taxpayer;

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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