Unemployment Insurance in High Informality Countries
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- Kirsten Sehnbruch & Rafael Carranza & Joaquín Prieto, 2019.
"The Political Economy of Unemployment Insurance based on Individual Savings Accounts: Lessons from Chile,"
Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 50(4), pages 948-975, July.
- Sehnbruch, Kirsten & Carranza, Rafael & Prieto, José Joaquín, 2018. "The political economy of unemployment insurance based on individual savings account: lessons from Chile," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90663, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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More about this item
Keywords
Unemployment; insurance; informality; Social Security; Labor Policy;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
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